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The paper performs aid allocation analysis using OECD-DAC data covering 20 aid 
donors and 176 recipients over the period 1980-2003. We improve upon earlier work in 
this area by employing inter alia the variable ‘past outcome’ measuring aid 
effectiveness in order to link together aid allocation and aid effectiveness. In line with 
previous work, we also account for both altruistic and selfish donor motives in the 
empirical analysis. As expected, empirical results based on Tobit estimates of aid 
allocation for individual donors vary quite significantly among donors. We also test the 
robustness of our results by estimating individual regressions for the major donors over 
the period 1990-2003 in view of major events in the aid arena during that time that 
could potentially have an impact on the aid allocation process. Our results seem to be 
similar to those derived over the 1980-2003 period, thus implying that this was not the 
case. Overall, both altruistic and selfish donor motives seem to motivate aid allocation 
for most donors over the two periods under examination. However, when we further 
restrict our time dimension to the 1999-2003 period, some important policy changes 
with regard to selectivity seem to emerge for a small group of donor countries. 
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Why do some poor countries receive so much aid and others so little? Humanitarian, 
commercial, political and strategic motives are usually identified as the main factors 
driving the aid allocation process. This is consistent with policy statements, especially 
from the major donors, which assert that aid is motivated by a humanitarian concern to 
promote development and alleviate needs, especially in the most needy countries, but at 
the same time also by commercial, political and strategic self-interests. The vast 
empirical literature dealing with the determinants of aid allocation clearly concludes 
that donors pursue political, economic and strategic interests in inter-country aid 
allocation, especially with regard to bilateral aid allocation of the larger donors, and that 
developmental or humanitarian concerns such as the reduction of poverty, receive a 
relatively low or even zero weight in this process (see McGillivray 2004 for a 
comprehensive discussion).  
Indeed, recent empirical work confirms that foreign policy goals of the donor continue 
to be the most important motive for giving aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and 
Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003a, 2003b; Gates and Hoeffler 2004).1 Earlier influential 
studies include McKinley and Little (1978, 1979); Mosley (1981); Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) and Trumbull and Wall (1994) among others. Cassen (1994) also finds 
that the United States targets more than one-third of its total assistance to Egypt and 
Israel for political reasons. The same author shows that many of the countries that 
receive the most aid per capita, such as Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Poland, do so because 
of their strategic importance. More recent studies include inter alia Schraeder, Hook 
and Taylor (1998); Lundborg (1998); Gounder (1999); Gounder and Sen (1999); 
Alesina and Dollar (2000); Svensson (2000); Neumayer (2003a, 2003b); Berthélemy 
and Tichit (2004); Dollar and Levin (2004) and more recently Canavire et al. (2005). 
Svensson (2000) examines the aid allocation of various donor countries over the period 
1970 to 1994. He finds that respect for political and civil rights has a positive impact on 
whether a country receives any aid at all in the case of donors such as Canada, Japan, 
and the US, but not Germany, Italy, Denmark, France and Sweden. He also finds that 
political and civil rights lead to higher total aid flows from Canada, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden, the so-called like-minded countries that traditionally put emphasis on 
democracy and human rights in their development assistance, and the UK. He finds no 
effect for the large donors—Germany, Japan and the US—on the part of whom he 
suggests that political and strategic goals render the rewarding of democratic regimes 
unimportant. Alesina and Dollar (2000) come to the conclusion that the 14 donors they 
look at differ from each other. They find that political rights have a positive impact on 
the amount of aid allocated by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
Scandinavian countries, the UK and the US but not for Austria, Belgium, France and 
Italy. Hence, while they confirm Svensson’s finding with respect to the UK, France and 
Italy—the like-minded countries—they come to more positive conclusions about 
Germany, Japan and the US. Neumayer (2003a) analyses bilateral aid allocation over 
the period 1985-97 by all 21 countries that form the OECD-DAC. In addition to the 
respect for civil and political rights, in the empirical analysis he also employs personal 
integrity rights. He finds that respect for civil and political rights plays a statistically 
                                                 
1   See also Mavrotas and Villanger (2006) for a recent discussion of altruistic and non-altruistic motives 
of donors.  
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significant role for almost all aid donors on whether a country is deemed eligible for aid. 
However, only the like-minded countries (with the exception of Sweden) as well as 
countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the UK and the US 
also provide more aid to more democratic regimes. He finds that countries with a 
greater respect for these rights receive more aid only from Australia, Denmark, Japan, 
New Zealand and the UK. Interestingly, these rights play a role in the aid allocation 
process of only a few donors and no systematic difference is apparent between the like-
minded countries and the rest of donor countries. This stands in striking contrast to the 
self-proclaimed commitment of the like-minded countries regarding the importance of 
human rights in their development assistance. 
Regarding the impact of corruption on aid allocation, Alesina and Weder (2002) find no 
statistical evidence to confirm that more aid goes to less corrupt countries in the case of 
American, British, Canadian, Italian, German, Spanish and Swiss aid. Only for 
Australia and the Scandinavian countries is there some evidence that low corruption is 
rewarded with higher levels of aid. Similarly Svensson (2000) finds no evidence that 
countries with less corruption are systematically rewarded with higher levels of 
combined bilateral and multilateral aid. Similar evidence for the non-importance of 
corruption in the aid allocation process is observed by Neumayer (2003a) with respect 
to the aggregate multilateral aid flows, the regional development banks as well as three 
UN agencies. The main conclusion of the study by Dollar and Levin (2004) is that the 
efficiency of aid allocation has gained in recent years in view of the growing importance 
(according to the authors) of selectivity issues in the donor community.2 Covering 22 
donors and 137 recipients over the period 1980-99, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) find 
that most donors rewarded good economic policies and good governance in the 1990s 
and that aid commitments per capita were higher for recipient countries with lower 
income levels. Gates and Hoeffler (2004) focus on the Nordic countries to examine 
donor behaviour over the period 1980-99 and to determine whether strategic motives 
affect the aid allocation process. They find that contrary to the case of the average 
bilateral donor, none of the Nordic countries allocated more aid to political allies, but 
rather that their aid flows were driven by the democracy and human rights records in aid 
recipients. More recently, Canavire et al. (2005) find that export-related self-interests of 
donor countries provide a fairly strong incentive for granting bilateral aid, as do colonial 
ties. Finally, in contrast to the findings by Dollar and Levin (2004), the authors cannot 
find evidence to indicate that multilateral aid is more poverty- and policy-oriented than 
bilateral assistance. 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to re-examine the factors affecting the 
aid allocation process. We use OECD-DAC data covering 20 aid donors and 
176 recipients over the period 1980-2003. In line with previous work in this area we 
account for both altruistic and selfish donor motives in the empirical analysis. However, 
we improve upon earlier work by including a more specific indicator of project 
performance (a variable that we label as ‘past outcomes’) to test the hypothesis that 
foreign aid rewards good policies. The variable was computed by the Operations and 
Evaluation Department (OED) at the World Bank and is collected in their publication 
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness. In doing so, we link together aid 
allocation and aid effectiveness in the empirical analysis. Our empirical model is based 
                                                 
2  See Beynon (2003); McGillivray (2003) and; Munro (2005) on the selectivity issue.  
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on a simple, static contract theory model focussing on the nature and implications of the 
incentive compatibility of conditional aid for donors (see next section).  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 briefly presents the theoretical model on 
which our empirical model is based. In section 3 we discuss definitions of the variables 
and data issues whereas econometric methodology issues are reviewed in section 4. 
Empirical results for all individual donors covering the period 1980-2003 are presented 
in section 5 and in section 6 we conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of 
our results. The last section concludes the paper. 
2 The  model 
The theoretical model employed here to derive our empirical model for the estimations 
draws on Isopi and Mattesini (2005). The model considers a bilateral development 
cooperation programme between two countries, a donor and a recipient country, which 
interact for one period. Foreign aid is given by the donor government to the government 
of the aid-recipient country with the aim of benefiting the recipient. 
The recipient country is inhabited by two types of agents: type I agents, which we also 
call ‘the elite’, and type II agents defined as ‘the poor’. The elite have access to a 
stochastic technology for converting an amount a of the good donated by the donor 
country into a higher level of output y(a). The distribution of the output between type I 
agents and type II agents is determined by the government of the country. Production is 
stochastic and is affected by the actions undertaken by type I agents. In every period the 
government of the donor country decides the amount of aid to transfer, taking into 
account the utility of the recipient country weighting differently the two population 
groups of the recipient. The transfer will occur only if the poor of the recipient country 
can derive benefit from it. In doing this, the main objective is to favour the poor of the 
recipient country and therefore try to maximize the utility of type II agents. However 
the donor country also takes into account the effects that its action have on the utility of 
type I agent which, in this model, has an active role in the production process. This 
intends to capture the idea (supported by the empirical literature on aid allocation) that 
donors’ motives may not be entirely oriented towards recipient needs. 
The game is divided into the following stages. At the beginning of the game, the 
government of the donor country offers an aid transfer to the government of   
the recipient country to implement a project. The aid transfer is given to the elite, the 
population group owning the technology. During that period the project is executed but 
the donor cannot observe the action undertaken by type I agents. In the next stage, the 
outcome of the project is also observed by the donor and the output is distributed 
between type I agents and type II agents. Solving the model we come up with three 
possible equilibria: two of them lead the donor to deliver a positive quantity of aid while 
the third one is a corner solution which implies no aid policy exists for the donor.3 
A reduced-form of the first equilibrium solution is given by: 
) , , , ( * δ κ λ γ a a =    (1)  
4 
where a* represents the equilibrium level of aid that the donor wants to transfer to the 
recipient, λ represents the interest that the donor has towards the type I agent, γ is the 
fraction of the output given to the elite4 and reflects the income distribution of   
the country. This fraction expresses not only the contribution type I agents give to the 
project due to ownership of the technology but also the political power they have within 
the country; δ represents the opportunity cost for the donor of giving foreign aid, i.e., 
reducing resources intended for his own population in favour of those of another 
country; the other component, κ, can be defined as the donor’s subjective cost 
associated with aid fungibility. The donor is aware that a fraction of the aid transfer may 
be diverted away from its intended use and this may represent a reason of concern 
among the population of the donor country. The higher the fraction of aid transfer 
diverted to alternative use, the higher its cost. 
This equilibrium indicates that in a situation where moral hazard is not a relevant 
problem, if the donor’s preference for the elite increases, this will imply more aid to the 
recipient country only if the elite receives a significant fraction of the output. By 
analogy, an increase in the level of output going to the elite will increase aid only if the 
donor assigns a relevant weight to the elite in its utility function. This interpretation can 
support the theory that the trend in aid flows is independent of the recipients’ ability in 
reducing poverty, as suggested by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). From their empirical 
results a clear declining trend in aid flows seems to emerge in a period when 
international cooperation seems to have reached its highest level. 
If the second equilibrium occurs, the optimal contract that the donor can offer to the 
recipient is given by the following reduced-form equation: 
)) ( , ( *
0 1 b a a + − = Φ Φ γ γ ψ    (2) 
where  ψ represents the elite’s disutility of undertaking the good project, and 
) (
0 1 b + −Φ Φ γ γ  can be interpreted as  the gain, in terms of utility, that the elite 
obtains from undertaking the project agreed in the contract. The level of aid implied by 
equilibrium (2) is increasing in the elite’s disutility of undertaking the good project, ψ, 
and is negatively correlated with the private benefit b, that the elite obtains when it 
undertakes bad action and depends negatively on the level of γ. Differently from the 
previous equilibrium, in this optimal contract, in order to maximize its utility the donor 
sets an aid transfer which rewards the disutility of effort the elite faces when it exerts 
the high level of effort. Concerned with efficiency issues, the donor therefore reduces 
the size of the transfer, either when the elite diverts too much funds for its private 
consumption, thus becoming the only agent to derive benefit from the project or when 
the reward for undertaking the project (as proper salary) tends to be too high, which 
implies that the poor receive only a small portion. Depending on which of these 
solutions will be the equilibrium, different contracts will take place and their 
determinants will be different in each case. When equilibrium is represented by 
Equation (1), the optimal transfer decreases as the cost function increases, even though 
it will be positively affected by the interest of the donor in the elite group; the 
                                                                                                                                               
3   For a more detailed explanation of the corner solution equilibrium, see Isopi and Mattesini (2005). 
4   In the model we assume that γ is exogenous.  
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distribution of the outcome between the two population groups in the recipient country 
also increases the aid transfer. If equilibrium is given by Equation (2), the donor decides 
to set the optimal transfer policy in accordance with the implementation made by the 
elite, i.e., the higher the disutility of the elite in exerting the effort, the higher the aid 
transfer the donor is prepared to make. 
The model we refer to allows us, in fact, to test whether a donor is imposing an 
incentive mechanism on the recipient in order to promote respect for the signed 
contract, and whether or not the mechanism is perceived as binding. Therefore, in what 
follows we estimate a model of aid allocation in which we include, where possible, 
variables that are representative of the bilateral relationship between the donor and the 
recipient. Going back to the model, we can argue that equilibrium (1) describes a 
situation in which the aid allocation process does not impose an incentive mechanism 
on the recipient country or at least it is not perceived as binding. The relevant 
parameters for such behaviour are the parameter λ which we identify in the empirical 
model as the fraction of ODA (official development aid) devoted to social 
infrastructure; the parameter γ which represents the distribution of income being 
considered, including the Gini index variable. In the empirical analysis, the cost of 
wasting, κ, is converted into the outcome variable: if the results of past investment 
projects are positive and the donor is really concerned about the possibility of diversion, 
there will be a tendency to target transfers towards recipients with a higher performance 
rate. Equilibrium (2) instead occurs when the donor imposes an incentive mechanism 
which is perceived by the recipient as binding. In this kind of equilibrium, the donor 
should favour countries where the degree of corruption is low, the economic 
performance (GDP growth rate) is generally good, democracy level (civil liberties) is 
high and good past outcomes (captured by a qualitative measure of aid effectiveness) 
are rewarded.  
3  Definitions of variables and data issues 
Our sample covers 176 aid recipients and 20 donors, members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, spanning the period 1980-2003. For each 
of the years from 1980 to 2003, we observe the aid commitments received by each 
recipient from each DAC member, but in contrast to the analysis of Berthélemy and 
Tichit (2004), we run the regressions individually for each donor. 
With regard to the dependent variable, it is more convenient to use aid commitments5 
rather than disbursements, as McGillivray and White (1993) point out.6 There is also 
                                                 
5   A commitment is a firm obligation expressed in an agreement or equivalent contract and supported by 
the availability of public funds, undertaken by the government, an official agency of the reporting 
country or an international organization, to furnish assistance in a specified amount under agreed 
financial terms and conditions and for specific purposes, for the benefit of a recipient country. 
6   A disbursement represents the actual international transfer of financial resources. They may be 
recorded at one of several stages: provision of goods and services, placing of funds at the disposal of 
the recipient in an earmarked fund or account, withdrawal of funds by the recipient from an earmarked 
fund or account payment by the donor of invoices on behalf of the recipient. The disbursement 
mechanism used tends to vary as a function of the type of financial (or technical) cooperation flow 
involved.  
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considerable debate on the choice of the endogenous variable as either aid per capita or 
aid levels (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992; Neumayer 2003b). In this paper we use 
per capita commitments as they allow us to test whether small countries receive more 
international support per capita than the big ones.7 
The first indicator we introduce is ‘trade’, a measure of bilateral trade between the 
donor and the recipient country. This variable describes the strength of commercial 
links between a donor and a recipient. In contrast to other papers where the economic 
interests of the donor are measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of the 
donor country as a percentage of its GDP, we use here the bilateral exports of the donor 
country to the recipient in order to capture the measure of interest that the donor has for 
the economy of the recipient country: i.e., foreign policy assistance based on donor 
self-interests will be biased towards countries which naturally tend to have more trade 
with the donor. This will result in a possible bias because when aid is given 
conditionally, more conditional aid may imply more imports from the donor. We try to 
limit the risk of bias by following the literature and using aid commitments as the 
dependent variable instead of disbursements, because these normally lag behind 
commitments, especially for the project loans and grants that require new equipment. It 
is notable, however, that the use of this indicator requires attention since trade flows are 
also correlated with country performance: richer recipients tend to trade more and this 
may result in less aid. 
Moreover, we include two regressors that provide information on the economic 
development of the recipient country: GDPpccd and GDPgrowthl. The former 
represents the level of GDP per capita in constant US dollars, whereas the latter 
represents the rate of growth of the GDP of the recipient. In line with conclusions 
emanating from the empirical literature, we expect that the first has a negative sign for 
those donors who target their transfers according to recipient needs and a positive sign 
for those donors who assign instead a higher weight to their self-interests. Since the 
second variable can be considered as a performance indicator of the recipient country, 
we would consequently expect a negative sign when recipient needs are supported by 
the donor. 
An indicator capturing whether donors are driven by recipient needs is represented by 
the bilateral ODA commitments according to purpose and in particular the portion that 
falls under the heading ‘social infrastructure and services’. The main category covers 
efforts to develop the human resource potential in order to ameliorate the living 
conditions in aid-recipient countries.8 The assumption is that the more aid a donor 
provides under this category, the greater the role of the recipients’ needs in the 
preferences of the donor: the poorest countries should receive more of this aid and the 
richest less. Moreover, this variable can also be considered as an indicator of the degree 
of altruism of the donor. If the share for this category is high in the overall amount of 
aid, we can conclude that the donor is truly oriented towards recipient needs. We are 
aware of the fact that recipients often receive huge amounts of per  capita aid even 
though they are fairly advanced economically. Table 1 reports Spearman rank 
                                                 
7   This analysis would not be possible if we consider the aid in absolute terms because in this case we 
will find for certain that big countries receive more aid. 
8   It includes also education, health and population, water supply, sanitation and sewerage.  
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correlation statistics computed for the sample countries according to bilateral per capita 
aid and per capita income of the recipient countries. 
The correlation analysis can provide some preliminary information on the issue of aid 
targeting. Denmark, Finland and Norway have the highest score, showing how targeting 
policies have always been implemented by these altruistic countries. Sweden and 
Ireland show an increasing trend, with a 38 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively, over 
the last four years. The opposite trend emerges for UK and Canada, indicating that in 
the past countries with a low per capita income received more aid than today. 
Table 1 
Bilateral per capita aid and per capita income  
Spearman rank correlation  
Country    1980-85 1986-90 1991-95  1996-2000  2000-03 

































































































































































































Japan does not reveal any significant relationship between the per capita income of 
recipients and per capita aid. This corresponds to Japan’s unfavourable position in the 
ranking of bilateral donors with regard to the aid component of the so-called 
commitment to development index (Roodman 2004). Being the exception for the first 
five years in the 1980s, Belgium shows a stable level of correlation between the two 
variables, about 25 per cent on average. Germany and the Netherlands have improved 
the targeting of per capita aid since the early 1990s and have thus caught up with the 
Scandinavian donors. 
We also include the Freedom House index of civil liberty, labelled ‘government’ in the 
regressions. This index measures freedom according to two broad categories: political 
rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, also having the right to vote, to compete for public office, and to elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the 
electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from 
the state.9 We expect this variable to have a positive influence on the aid allocation 
process, signalling to the recipient countries that democratic institutions may attract 
more foreign assistance. 
As the ‘usual factors’, i.e., variables that are commonly included in aid allocation 
studies, we include few regressors belonging either to the recipient needs or the 
self-interests of the donor. The first one included in the analysis is the ‘bilateral military 
transfers’. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all transfers of 
the seven different categories of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the present 
day. Information is compiled from publicly available media as well as government and 
industry sources. SIPRI uses the term ‘transfer’ rather than ‘trade’ since the latter is 
usually associated with sales.10  
From Table 2, which presents the Spearman rank correlation between the variable ‘arms 
transfers’ and bilateral ODA,11 it emerges that there is a link between the direction of 
foreign aid flows and arms transfers. The magnitude of the correlation coefficient 
changes from donor to donor and also over time but it is still possible to conclude from 
this preliminary test that countries, which receive more aid from a certain donor, are 
also the same countries to which the donor conducts more arms transfers. In view of 
this, we also include this variable as an indicator of donor self-interests and we expect 
the sign to be positive. 
                                                 
9   The survey includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings for 192 countries and 18 selected 
territories. Each country and territory are assigned a numerical rating, which is calculated based on the 
methodology described below, on a scale of 1 to 7. The total number of points awarded to the political 
rights and civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings. Each point 
total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of 
freedom. 
10 This database covers not only the sales of weapons, including manufacturing licences, but also other 
forms of weapon supply, including aid and gifts. Transferred weapons must be destined for the armed 
forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. Weapons supplied to or from 
rebel forces in an armed conflict are included as deliveries to or from the individual rebel forces, 
identified under separate recipient or supplier headings. Supplies to or from international 
organizations are also included and categorized in the same fashion. 
11 See also tables on aid concentration in White (2004).  
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Table 2 
Bilateral aid and arms transfers indicator 
  Spearman rank correlation 


































































We include the infant mortality rate and the Gini index as social policy outcome 
variables. The first represents the infant mortality rate of the recipient country, i.e., the 
probability of dying between birth and one year of age, expressed per 1,000 live births. 
The second variable measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or 
consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. According to the literature, these indicators belong to the 
category of need indicators, i.e., variables that provide information on the economic and 
social situation of the recipient country. By including these regressors in the estimation, 
we expect that the countries pursuing good policies be rewarded with a higher foreign 
aid flows, but that on the other hand, because these indicators represent for the donors a 
measure of need of the recipient country, aid flows should be higher in countries that 
have low values in both indices. 
In order to test the hypothesis that foreign aid rewards good policies, we include in the 
estimation model a more specific indicator of project performance,12 i.e., the variable 
we label ‘past outcomes’. This variable is computed by the Operations and Evaluation 
Department (OED) at the World Bank and is collected in their publication Annual 
Review of Development Effectiveness. Each year, the OED evaluates the projects 
undertaken by the World Bank in a certain country and assigns to them an evaluation 
score that varies from highly unsatisfactory to highly satisfactory, i.e., a score ranging 
from one to six. In fact, this represents a qualitative measure of a revised economic rate 
                                                 
12 We are perfectly aware that by focusing on project evaluation we are overlooking an important 
fraction of aid, i.e., programme assistance. However this is caused by data availability problems since 
the data on evaluations made by the World Bank are limited to project aid.   
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of return at evaluation calculated on the projects implemented by the World Bank. In 
order to have a single value per year, we take for each recipient country the evaluation 
average of the World Bank projects in that specific year without distinguishing for 
specific sectors. Project-specific appraisals can only assess the project’s rate of return or 
its acceptability. This approach is problematic for two reasons, both of which are 
important for multilateral lending agencies and donors interested in the impact not only 
of aid-financed projects but also of aid itself. First, aid flows, at least to some extent, are 
fungible. It is unlikely that the projects evaluated by the World Bank, for example, are 
so marginal that they would not otherwise have been carried out. For the 99 projects 
evaluated in 1993, the World Bank (1994) finds an average economic rate of return of 
21 per cent, which is too high to indicate marginal projects. Second, even if a project 
would not have been undertaken without external funding, there is no guarantee that that 
particular project was the best of those being considered.  
It is well-known that careful evaluation is limited by the lack of information, but project 
evaluation still has a key role to play. The growth of the aid industry has in recent years 
had both positive and negative effects. On the plus side, there is more money available, 
and more experiences to share. On the negative side, in the frenetic rush to find and 
fund projects and to speed disbursement, there is not adequate time to assess what is 
being done, and to rely on past experience for programme improvement. In general, the 
scale of the evaluation operation correlates with the size of the agency. Several agencies 
have an evaluation unit which is independent of the operational divisions, as for 
example, the World Bank and FAO. This has the merit of allowing impartial assessment 
of projects, but it also means that it can only offer advice and suggestions, which are not 
always acted upon by the operational divisions. The World Bank is the only identified 
agency to have made a formal study of projects 10 to 15 years after completion. The 
observations from that study were found to be very instructive; perhaps this type of 
evaluation should be carried out more frequently. Along the above lines, the variable 
‘past outcome’ seems to be a good proxy (though by no means perfect) in measuring the 
success or failure of past international cooperation projects. 
4 Estimation  methodology 
Many of the statistical problems related to the estimation of aid allocation models 
emanate from the fact that many donors give a definite amount of aid to some recipient 
countries and nothing to others. The data include every country that has received aid 
from each donor in the period under examination. DAC lists 176 recipient countries and 
this represents the maximum number of countries a single donor may give aid to. No 
donor gives aid to fewer than 100 countries, and the most generous donors are France 
and Japan, giving aid to 160 and 161 recipients, respectively. Major donors tend to 
disburse aid to a large number of countries, whereas smaller donors tend to concentrate 
aid on a few recipients.13 
                                                 
13  The Scandinavian countries provide a percentage of aid to a smaller number of recipients as compared 
to the potential number in the given sample.  
11 
The above seems to suggest that the dependent variable, aid, is only partly continuous 
with positive probability mass of zero value.14 Consequently, we deal with a censored 
dependent variable, which implies that we need to implement a non-linear estimation 
method capable of estimating censored data.15 Three models exist in the econometric 
literature to deal with this type of situation, all based on the maximum likelihood 
method. These are the Tobit model, the Heckman sample selection model and the 
two-part model. In line with Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Canavire et al. (2005) 
and since it is rather difficult to find appropriate exclusion variables for the first step of 
the Heckman procedure, we employ the Tobit model in our empirical analysis.  
The Tobit model or censored regression model is characterized by a dependent variable 
which exhibits censoring at some value because all the negative values are censored to 




+ + = β α
'
*                where   ) , 0 (
2 σ N ui ≈    (3) 
yi= y*i    if  y*i  > 0   (4) 
yi= 0       if  y*i  < 0   (5) 
As we have already anticipated, it would be meaningless to argue that donors have 
negative expected levels of aid commitments16 for some countries. Therefore they set 
the level of this money to equal to zero. 
It is true that one strand of research wants to determine if there are differences in the 
determinants of aid eligibility and the determinants of the amount of aid allocated. 
However, in this model we assume that the process of selecting recipient countries has 
been already concluded, and that the donor is only interested in setting the optimal 
amount of the aid transfer. Therefore, the model of aid allocation we intend to estimate 
is given by: 
 a*ij,t= Max(0, B xij,t + uij,t + vij,t)    (6) 
where i stands for the recipient country, j the donor country and t time, a* stands for the 
quantity of aid per capita, x is the vector of the explanatory variables (discussed in the 
previous section), B the vector of the parameters associated with the regressors and  
the u and v stand for two iid random variables. 
 
 
                                                 
14  See also Roodman (2004) on the truncated nature of the aid variable. 
15  OLS estimations depend on the assumption that the expected value of the dependent variable is linear 
in the explanatory variables, which is violated by the fact that the independent variable has positive 
probability mass at value zero. 
16  Aid disbursements can be negative because of repayment, but not commitments.  
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5 Estimation  results 
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper uses a database consisting of 20 donor 
countries and 176 recipients spanning the period 1980-2003. In order to fully capture 
the differences in the aid allocation process among individual countries, we run separate 
regressions for each donor using the ODA per capita commitment of a single donor as 
the dependent variable. We also test whether the results are sensitive to a different 
specification of the estimation equation. Thus, we report the results in Tables 1-8 in 
Appendix I for the four separate regressions for each donor country. The tables are 
structured as follows: Equation (1) estimates the model without the ‘past outcomes’ 
variable whereas Equation (2) estimates the full model; in Equations (3) and (4) we test 
whether the model is sensitive to the use of the different poverty variables, i.e., the 
infant mortality rate and the Gini index. 
Table 1 in Appendix I reports regression results for the USA. The per capita income 
has, as expected, a significantly negative impact on aid received, even though the 
magnitude of the coefficient is low. An even stronger negative impact on the aid 
allocated is given by the lagged growth. This variable is an indicator of the economic 
performance of the recipient countries. In our regressions, the negative sign seems to 
suggest that the US aid policy is oriented towards countries where the level of growth is 
still quite low. In line with the results of the empirical literature, the population variable 
has the expected negative sign even though it is not always significant. In the more 
complete specification of the estimation model, the sign remains negative although no 
longer significant. To capture whether the behaviour of the donor is driven by recipient 
needs, the variable included in the regression is ‘social’, i.e., the share of ODA devoted 
to developing human resource potential and ameliorating living condition in aid-recipient 
countries. As we can see from Table 1, the significance and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is independent from the possible specifications of the estimated equations. It 
is also notable that this variable is particularly significant when associated with the infant 
mortality rate. The ‘government’ variable used to measure the level of democracy and 
civil liberties in the recipient countries is an indicator which assigns a high number to 
countries where the level of civil liberties is low. Our results seem to suggest that in the 
case of the US, the relationship between the regressor and aid flows is negative and 
significant, as expected, thus indicating that USA gives more aid to countries where the 
level of civil liberties is low. This can have an ambiguous interpretation. Usually 
countries with a low level of civil liberties also depend on aid; on the other hand, this 
variable may be an indicator of a strategic donor which—by giving foreign aid—may 
more or less indirectly support the government of recipient country whose degree of 
democracy is low. In contrast to some results in the empirical literature, significance of 
the bilateral trade variable is very low also in the most complete specification. Another 
variable which apparently does not seem to influence ODA commitments is the ‘arms 
transfers’. The sign of the coefficient changes according to the specification used but is 
always non-significant. This may be due to the lack of data for all the recipients in the 
sample. Summing up, it seems that the US aid allocation process is driven more by 
political and humanitarian reasons than economic variables. 
On the basis of the results reported in Table 1, UK’s aid allocation process presents 
different elements compared to the US. From the first equation we can notice that per 
capita income is not significant, suggesting that this variable is not a leading factor in 
allocating aid flows. Instead, an interesting finding is that the Gini index, when 
included, always has the expected sign and is significant, indicating that the income  
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distribution of the population is more relevant for the UK than the level of per capita 
income. Also the social and economic variables, social aid and civil liberties, are with 
the expected sign (and significance). In almost all the regressions, the bilateral trade 
variable has the expected sign (positive) but is never significant. The population 
variable is always significant and with the expected sign (negative), supporting the 
paradox that small countries receive more aid per capita than big ones. This 
interpretation is confirmed by the lagged growth variable, which is positive and 
significant almost in all the specifications. This reflects the assumption that in the 
allocation of foreign aid, UK is sensitive to growth performance, which would insure 
low probability of diversion of funds as well as their better utilization, but would also 
imply that the recipients are not the most needy. The variable outcome, which reflects 
recipients’ past performance as evaluated by the World Bank, goes in the opposite 
direction. The variable in fact has the expected sign (positive) though not significant in 
all the regressions tried. 
In contrast to both of the previously mentioned donor countries, it would seem that 
French aid flows are driven by factors other than altruism or a reflection of recipient 
needs. In fact, the fraction of the ODA devoted to develop the human resource potential 
is highly significant but the sign is negative. On the other hand, aid flows seem to be 
positively affected by bilateral trade. The level of democracy, expressed by the civil 
liberties indicator, is not significant in any of the estimated equations. Instead, the infant 
mortality rate is positive and significant, suggesting that a 20 per cent increase in the 
infant mortality rate corresponds to an increase of US$1.19 in bilateral aid flows. The 
other social policy outcome variable included in the model—the Gini index—is highly 
significant and positive; this seems to indicate that France directs its aid flows to 
developing countries where income distribution is more equitable. The indicator of 
bilateral arms transfers continues to remain non-significant in all the equations even 
though the sign is as expected (positive), thus preventing any firm conclusions. The per 
capita income variable is positive and significant and the size variable (population) is 
instead negative and highly significant. This means that France is more oriented to small 
countries with a medium level of per capita income. The outcome variable has the 
expected sign, which is positive and significant, i.e., the French foreign aid allocation 
takes in account the past performance of its recipients and uses its transfers to reward 
for good past outcomes. There is no major change in the results with the inclusion of the 
Gini index and the infant mortality rate separately in the model. 
Turning to the results of Table 1 on the aid allocation process of Germany, we observe 
that Germany emerges as a donor country strongly motivated by recipient needs. 
Recipient countries that are governed with democratic institutions but with a high level 
of the infant mortality rate seem to receive higher per capita aid flows. Size also matters 
in all the regressions estimated: small countries receive more than the bigger nations. In 
Equation 1 the income distribution and the arms transfers indicator are not significant, 
thus preventing conclusions regarding their effect. Bilateral trade has the expected sign, 
i.e., negative but has a low level of significance, suggesting that Germany does not link 
trade relations to foreign aid assistance. In Equation 2 we drop the lagged growth 
variable and add the outcome variable. The new variable weakens the significance of 
the other regressors but remains non-significant. In Equation 4 we drop the Gini index, 
the social variable, from the model but the results do not seem to change dramatically. 
Japan’s aid allocation process seems to be driven by a combination of altruistic factors 
and donor self-interests. The portion of ODA utilized in social infrastructure affects  
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positively foreign aid flows. Also civil liberties have a strongly positive and significant 
impact on aid flows, suggesting overall that countries whose average level of the 
indicator is higher than 3.5 receive more aid flows.17  The bilateral trade variable, even 
though it has a positive sign in all the regressions, is close to being significant but does 
not reach the threshold level. The other variables, i.e., income per capita, arms transfers 
and infant mortality, are not significant. Therefore we assume that they do not exert a 
relevant influence on Japanese aid flows. The situation described in Equation 2 (see 
Table 3, where the outcome variable is introduced) does not produce any relevant 
changes and the variable itself is not significant, making Japanese aid flows 
unconditional on the performance of the recipient. 
Turning to Canada (Table 1), our results seem to suggest that the variable with the 
strongest impact is that portion of bilateral ODA which covers the efforts to develop and 
ameliorate the basic needs of the recipient countries, i.e., the social aid variable. This 
variable is positive and highly significant in all the specifications of the model and also 
has a coefficient of a high magnitude. Bilateral trade, on the other hand, has a negative 
impact, supporting the perception that only recipient needs matter for Canada, not donor 
self-interests. As already noted for other donors, small poor countries receive more aid 
than poor nations with a medium-income level.  
In view of the results reported in Table 1, Switzerland appears to be strongly recipient-
needs oriented with a high, positive and significant coefficient associated with bilateral 
ODA transferred to the social infrastructure sector, and a negative significant coefficient 
associated with bilateral trade. In the case of Switzerland the presence of democratic 
institution is not rewarded, but as we have already argued, this can be interpreted with 
two opposite views: it can be argued, on the one hand, that this is a signal that a donor is 
financing a non-democratic regime. But on the other hand we are aware that the less 
democratic country is also the less-developed one and consequently, the most in need of 
foreign assistance. The paradox regarding population size does not seem to apply in the 
case of Switzerland, and therefore, the most populated countries receive also more 
foreign aid per capita. Moreover, the per capita income level also matters. Finally, the 
distribution of income among the population and the past outcome variable do not seem 
to be important determinants of Switzerland’s allocation process (see Equation 2 in 
Table 3 and Equation 4 in Table 7). 
On the contrary, the elements that influence Spain’s aid allocation are a mixture of 
donor self-interest and recipient needs (Table 1). The bilateral share of ODA devoted to 
investment in social infrastructure and development projects is significant and has a 
positive sign. But at the same time trade relations seem to play a leading role in foreign 
aid allocation. Comparing these results to those obtained previously for other donors, 
we can argue that the bilateral trade variable is usually more significant for countries 
which in the past have been colonial powers and which continue to have economic 
relations with their former colonies. Spain favours recipients with democratic 
institutions and more equal income distribution, characteristics belonging to the lower- 
and middle-income country categories.18 The lagged growth variable is also positive 
and significant. In Equation 2, as we show in Table 3 where the outcome variable is 
                                                 
17  The indicator level varies from one to seven. 
18  The countries receiving from Spain the higher percentage of foreign aid belong to these categories.  
15 
introduced, the previously obtained results are confirmed. The variable itself is highly 
significant and with the expected sign (positive). In the last equation we included the 
social policy outcome variable, i.e., the infant mortality rate. According to the results 
reported, countries with unsatisfactory hygienic conditions and wide-spread 
malnutrition receive more aid per capita. The variables which always remain non-
significant are the arms transfers indicator and the level of per capita income, suggesting 
that political and strategic factors do not exert a relevant impact in the allocation 
process. 
Summing up the results for Netherlands, the country seems to be motivated more by 
recipient needs than by donor interests. In Equation 1, the high significance of the 
positive effect of the fraction of bilateral ODA committed to social projects needs to be 
highlighted, as does the negative effect of trade relationship on the aid flows transferred 
by the Netherlands. The sign of the performance indicators is ambiguous. In fact, an 
increase in the recipient’s growth rate negatively affects aid flows, suggesting that as 
soon as Netherlands’ aid-recipients show substantial improvement, the donor diverts the 
designated funds to other countries considered to be more needy. In that sense, the 
interpretation of the positive effect of the level of per capita income on the per capita 
bilateral aid becomes ambiguous, indicating that countries with even a small increase in 
the per capita income receive a high fraction of aid. In Equation 2 of Table 3 we include 
the outcome variable, which does not alter the results of the previous equation since it is 
non-significant. The picture does not change when the Gini index variable is included in 
the last two equations; it is non-significant even in the most complete specification of 
the model. 
From the estimation results for Australia, it is noted that the economic (trade) interests 
have the strongest influence on the country’s development cooperation. Furthermore, 
small, poor yet democratic countries receive more than big, medium-income and non-
democratic nations. In all specifications neither the past outcome variable nor the lagged 
growth variable has a significant impact on the aid allocation process (see Tables 1 
and 3). 
From the regressions estimated for Italy (reported in Tables 2 and 4), it can be noted 
that some elements have a strong influence on the allocation of aid flows while others 
are somehow ambiguous. An increase of 1 per cent in bilateral ODA devoted to social 
infrastructure generates an increment of 15 per cent in the level of per capita aid flows; 
at the same time, it seems that aid flows are more concentrated towards small countries 
where the monitoring of funds is easier and aid can therefore be more effective. 
Moreover, it is found that countries with a more equitable income distribution, a high 
level in the indicator for civil liberties and a lower infant mortality rate receive more aid 
flows. The indicators for bilateral trade and arms transfers are not significant. The 
results obtained in the previous equation are confirmed in Equation 2 in Table 4, which 
includes the outcome variable. In fact, the new variable is significant and positive, 
sustaining the assumption that with regard to development cooperation Italy has 
increased the level of monitoring in resource transfers and that it is particularly affected 
by positive past performance in the recipient countries. 
Ireland’s policy of foreign aid allocation is, as we can see from Table 2, a weighted mix 
of donor interests and recipient needs. Size matters positively, as is also the case for 
more equitable income distribution. Moreover, Ireland recognizes that the ability of the 
population to organize themselves to participate in the political process and influence  
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national and local policies and programmes is the single most important factor for 
improving human conditions. Democracy and good governance—that is, democratic 
institutions and the quality of the processes and practice of governance—are critical 
factors influencing the development process and human conditions. Therefore, countries 
able to promote and encourage these conditions are rewarded with more aid per capita. 
In Equation 3 in Table 6 and Equation 4 in Table 8, we note that a decrease in the Gini 
index or in the infant mortality rate leads to higher aid flows. The outcome variable, on 
the other hand, has a negative coefficient but is non-significant. 
Table 2 also presents the results on the factors driving the aid allocation process in New 
Zealand. Both equations presented in Tables 2 and 4 indicate that economic 
considerations are the leading factors in New Zealand. Bilateral trade is always positive 
and highly significant; investment in social infrastructure, on the contrary, tends to 
reduce the level of disbursed per capita foreign aid. Despite economic factors playing a 
key role for this donor, countries with more developed democratic institutions and with 
a low level of infant mortality rate are preferred. Apparently, it would seem that bigger-
sized countries with good performance receive more aid per capita. In both equations, 
two regressors remain non-significant, namely the arms transfers indicator and the 
lagged growth variable. Economic factors seem to be more relevant than the political 
and strategic ones. 
Portugal exhibits several relevant features, with bilateral trade and bilateral ODA 
targeted to infrastructure being dominant. Small democratic countries with a medium 
per capita income, equitably distributed, enjoy more per capita from Portugal’s foreign 
aid. The high significance of the outcome variable (Equation 2 in Table 4) underlies the 
importance that this donor assigns to the use of resources.19 
The results obtained for Denmark (Table 2) seem to suggest a clear tendency in 
focusing on recipient needs rather than donor interests. In fact, all the variables which 
formally reflect recipient needs have the expected sign and are highly significant. Also 
the bilateral trade variable which, as already explained, reflects the economic interests 
of the donor country, is negative and significant, highlighting that trade relations, at 
least for Denmark, are  not an important factor in aid giving. The civil liberties variable 
is highly significant and with the expected negative sign. The only one which is highly 
non-significant is the arms transfers variable, indicating that strategic interests are not of 
relevance in Danish cooperation programmes. The outcome variable, introduced in 
Equation 2 in Table 4, is highly significant, i.e., the effectiveness of past aid transfers 
affects positively the probability of receiving more aid funds in the future. 
The aid allocation process of Sweden, as illustrated in Table 2, is strongly influenced by 
humanitarian elements and is oriented towards recipient needs. In fact, in the first 
regression, the social policy variables—i.e., infant mortality rate, Gini index and civil 
liberties—are significant and have the expected sign. Bilateral trade, instead, is negative 
and highly significant. It also becomes apparent from the estimation results that in 
addition to factors which reflect recipient needs, Sweden’s aid allocation is affected by 
the recipient’s performance or its stage of development. In fact, it clearly emerges that 
countries with a higher level of per capita income receive more aid flows, even if lagged 
growth is non-significant. When the outcome variable is included, it is also positive and 
                                                 
19  In the case of Portugal we had to drop the arms transfers variable due to lack of observations.  
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highly significant, suggesting that Sweden tends to transfer a higher level of aid flows to 
countries that are able to use aid effectively. 
In Table 2 we give the regression results for Norway, a country that has always been 
considered as altruistic among the DAC donors. The share of bilateral ODA 
commitment devoted to social infrastructure and human development enhancement has 
the expected sign and is highly significant, thus supporting the view that Norway’s aid 
is positively affected by recipient needs. We also find that the government variable, i.e., 
civil liberties, has the right sign and is significant, implying therefore that recipients 
with democratic institutions receive more aid transfers. Even thought the infant 
mortality rate has the expected sign (negative), it is never significant, but this may be 
due to the high number of missing values for this variable. The Gini index, which 
reflects income distribution considerations, is non-significant, as is also the case with 
the level of per capita income. The size of the recipient country (the population 
variable) seems to matter and is not affected by the usual paradox regarding this 
variable, i.e., that small countries usually receive more aid per capita. In Equation (1) of 
Table 2, the arms transfers indicator is not significant, indicating that it is not important 
in the Norwegian aid flows. When we choose a more general specification (Equation 2 
of Table 4), the results are not affected by the inclusion of the outcome variable.  In 
Equations 3 and 4 in Tables 6 and 8, we drop the infant mortality rate and re-run the 
regressions with and without the outcome variable. The exclusion of the social policy 
variable alters the results significantly: first, the level of per capita income becomes 
significant and with the expected sign (negative), suggesting that recipients with lower 
per capita income receive more foreign aid. The lagged growth variable, indicating 
country performance, remains positive and significant while the indicator of arms 
transfers and the Gini index remain non-significant. In Equation 4 in Table 8, we 
include the outcome variable which is positive and highly significant, i.e., countries 
attaining good outcome in past projects should receive a higher level of aid flows in the 
future. 
The dataset for Finland does not allow us to draw substantial conclusions regarding 
factors that affect its allocation process. As we can see from Table 2, the majority of the 
regressors included in the model are not significant in any of the specifications tried. 
The fraction of bilateral ODA enhancing the development process is one of the few 
factors having the expected sign (positive) and being highly significant. Moreover, from 
the estimation results we can argue that in the case of Finland, big countries with a low 
level of per capita income receive a higher level of foreign aid. On the other hand, it 
seems that bilateral trade and income distribution do not significantly affect the aid 
allocation process. Both in Equation 3 in Table 6 and Equation 4 in Table 8, the 
outcome variable is positive and highly significant, indicating that Finland tends to 
reward more generously countries that indicate good performance on the aid 
effectiveness front. The arms transfers indicator is not significant, but as Finland has 
always been considered an altruistic donor, this result is not surprising. 
The last two countries in our sample—Austria and Belgium—deserve a brief 
introduction. First of all, we were unable to estimate the complete model due to 
difficulties in obtaining long series for the arms transfers and  GDPpccd variables 
because of missing values. The results for Austria, shown in Table 2, do not allow us to 
draw robust conclusions with regard to aid allocation. Also, variables that usually seem 
to be highly significant in most of the donors do not seem to play a key role in this case. 
Overall it appears that the most populated countries with equitable income distribution  
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receive more Austrian aid. The outcome variable is also non-significant. For Belgium, 
even though some variables had to be dropped, we are able to draw certain conclusions. 
It seems that the social component of aid is highly significant, as are the size of the 
recipient country and its form of government. Furthermore, the more equal the income 
distribution of the recipient country and more sound its institutional environment, the 
more aid will be forthcoming. Finally, the outcome variable in the case of Belgium is 
highly significant. 
6  Sensitivity analysis: testing for the experience of the 1990s and 2000s 
In this section we examine whether the results discussed above are sensitive to the 
selection of the time period utilized. The recent empirical literature suggests that due to 
major events in the aid arena in recent years, it is possible to argue that the factors 
driving the aid allocation process might have been different in the 1980s than in the 
1990s. In a recent paper, Dollar and Levin (2004) argue that while donors in the 1980s 
allocated aid without adopting a selection criterion, this trend was reversed in the 
following decade, partly due to major events in the overall aid architecture but also 
partly to the policy lessons emerging from the very influential (but also debatable) study 
‘Aid, Polices and Growth’ (Burnside and Dollar 2000). According to these authors, only 
countries that can guarantee a sound institutional environment and ‘good policies’ 
should deserve to receive foreign aid. Along the above lines and in order to test the this 
hypothesis, we estimate our empirical model for 11 major donors over the period 1990- 
2003. We run two regressions for each donor, with and without the past outcome 
variable. Our results are reported in Tables 1a-1b and Tables 2a-2b in Appendix II. 
Comparing the results for the United States in Table 1 in Appendix I and Table 1a in 
Appendix II, we can observe that no great changes have occurred. All the regressors 
maintain the same sign for the entire period, even though they lose in significance. This 
is not the case for the trade variable which turns to be non-significant in the 1990s, thus 
indicating that economic factors lost their importance after the end of the cold war. The 
outcome variable continues to be non-significant also during the 1990s, confirming the 
conclusions of other studies (see Gates and Hoeffler 2004) that not all donors have 
become more selective in recent years. Table 1a (and 2a) in Appendix II, reporting 
results also for the UK, exhibits very little change compared to the full period model. 
The variable trade continues to be significant, as is also the case with the outcome 
variable. It is also noted that the more democratic countries or those investing in the 
reform of their political institutions receive more aid. This variable has the expected 
sign already in the full model but becomes significant only in the 1990s. 
In the case of France, we can report several changes. First, both the social aid 
component and the economic component become non-significant. The population 
variable seems to explain the majority of the variance of the model, confirming that the 
smaller the recipient, the generous its aid receipts. The infant mortality rate is still a 
leading factor in the French aid allocation process, while the outcome variable is 
significant but only at the 10 per cent level. For Germany we find that all the results 
obtained in the full period model are also confirmed for the 1990s. As we can see from 
Tables 1a and 2a in Appendix II, all the variables in fact maintain the same sign and 
almost the same level of significance.  
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Japan20  continues to be among the donors rewarding good policies and sound 
institutional environment. From Tables 1a and 2a, we also see that both the social and 
the economic components of aid are important in its allocation process. The outcome 
variable continues to be non-significant also in the restricted time-period model.  
For Canada the most striking change concerns the income distribution variable in the 
recipient countries. As we can see, the level of per capita income now turns out to be 
non-significant but the population’s income distribution becomes relevant, which may 
reveal more selectivity towards the very poor countries. An other important feature of 
the new results is reflected in the arms transfers variable which is now significant and 
with the right sign also, suggesting that arms transfers negatively affect Canada’s aid 
allocation process. The results for Switzerland are substantially maintained (see Tables 
1a and 2a). The only feature worthy of comment is the loss of significance of the 
government variable, indicating that the recipient country’s level of democracy does not 
affect Switzerland’s aid allocation criteria. 
Let us now focus on the Scandinavian countries. Tables 1b and 2b in Appendix II report 
the results for Denmark. The new estimates also on the part of Denmark confirm the 
previous results: the majority of the regressors maintain the expected sign and turn out 
to be significant, but with two notable exceptions: the Gini and arms transfers variables. 
The former becomes significant only for the 1990s, but only when the outcome variable 
is excluded from the model. Instead, the latter variable becomes highly significant in 
both specifications, indicating a major change in the determinants of aid allocation. The 
results for Sweden verify all the main findings already obtained for the full sample. 
Also in this case, all the variables maintain the sign of the full time-period model and in 
certain cases (see outcome and arms transfers) the significance increases in the 1990s. 
In the case of Norway, we can observe a general decrease in the significance of the 
variables included in the regressions, although overall the variables that were 
non-significant in the full-period model also remain non-significant in the restricted 
time period. Some of these, such as the population and government variables, become 
non-significant in the 1990s. Finally, results for Finland overall seem to confirm the 
initial conclusions, although the outcome variable now gains significance. 
In order to strengthen our conclusions further, we decided to restrict the time period 
covered by focussing on the last five years, i.e., 1999-2003. As already mentioned, new 
empirical literature exists which seems to suggest that during the last decade donors 
have increased their policy of selectivity towards recipients. As our regression results 
have shown, this result does not emerge from the regressions for the 1990s. However, 
we reach different conclusions when we focus on the last five years and rerun the 
regression with the inclusion of the outcome variable for selected donor countries (see 
Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix II).  
For the USA, this last regression basically confirms the results obtained for the 1990s. 
The variable trade, which has always had a negative sign, becomes highly significant, 
highlighting how the USA aid allocation process, especially recently, has been 
motivated by factors other than economic ones. The outcome variable remains non-
significant, thus not allowing us to draw any conclusions regarding its impact on the aid 
allocation process. Another important fact is that the Gini index changes its sign and 
                                                 
20  We had to drop the Arms Transfers variable due to the lack of data in period under examination.  
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now becomes negative but highly significant. This may be considered as a signal that 
the USA aid allocation policy has lately been motivated more by recipient needs than 
self-interest. The arms transfers variable remains non-significant. 
In Table 4 we report the results for the United Kingdom. Comparing these with results 
reported in Table 1a in Appendix II, we notice that overall there are no changes in the 
UK aid allocation policy. In fact, this process seems to be strongly driven by factors 
which refer to recipient needs, such as the variables government, Gini index and social 
aid. In the case of this country, the outcome variable continues to be a non-relevant 
factor. 
The results obtained for France seem to suggest some change over the 1999-2003 
period. Indeed, in comparison to Table 3 economic factors become positive and highly 
significant. The government  variable decreases in significance in line with results 
obtained previously. The outcome variable seems to start increasing in significance, 
suggesting that France may belong to the particular group of donor countries that have 
recently adopted selectivity. 
Table 3 presents the results for Germany. Comparing these results to those reported in 
Table 1a of Appendix II, a relevant change in the aid allocation process seems to 
emerge. In fact, if we exclude the variables social aid and trade, the other regressors 
either change sign or significance. This is the case for the variable government, for 
instance, which becomes non-significant. On the other hand, the infant mortality rate is 
significant and with a positive sign, indicating that Germany tends to give more aid to 
countries where the infant mortality rate is high and income distribution among the 
population groups more equal. Another relevant difference is obvious from the outcome 
variable, which turns out to be highly significant. Summing up, we can argue that the 
German aid allocation process seems to have changed completely in the last few years, 
with increased attention towards the recipient countries and more generous aid towards 
those that can guarantee better results in terms of outcome. 
Substantial changes are documented also for Japan, as Table 3 shows. First, we can 
notice that economic factors as captured by the variable trade, have a significant 
negative effect on the aid allocation process, compared to results for the 1990s. The 
Gini index variable changes signs and becomes almost significant, thus suggesting that 
the more warped the income distribution becomes in a recipient country, the more aid it 
receives from Japan. The infant mortality rate and the government variables are not 
significant, which is in line with the results reported in Table 1a of Appendix II. Finally, 
the outcome variable continues to be non-significant. 
The results for Switzerland also indicate some change. The first is related to the variable 
government which has the expected sign and turns out to be highly significant, thus 
indicating that countries ruled by democratic institutions receive more aid. Looking at 
the other regressors, it seems that the aid allocation process in Switzerland has recently 
been oriented more towards recipient needs, and has favoured countries plagued by 
unequal income distribution, high infant mortality rates and lacking good results in 
project outcome, as Table 4 shows.  
In contrast to the above-mentioned donor, the results of the 1999-2003 period for 
Denmark seem to confirm the findings obtained for the 1990s. In fact, all the variables 
keep the same sign even though some of them decrease in significance, as can be seen  
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for population, social aid and government,  which turn to be non-significant. The 
outcome variable loses in significance, even though the sign remains positive. 
Sweden (Table 4) seems to be associated with certain changes over the period examined 
with regard to the criteria of its overall aid allocation process. Indeed, it is confirmed 
that the social aid variable has a strong impact on the aid allocation process but at the 
same time, economic factors tend to have a stronger negative effect. The variables 
government and the Gini index turn out to be non-significant, whereas the strong 
influence of the variables arms transfers, level of the GDP per capita and outcome 
remains the same.  
The results for Norway for the 1999-2003 period seem to confirm those obtained for the 
1990s with regard to the outcome variable, which continues to appear with the positive 
sign but now non-significant. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Finland. All the 
variables retain the same sign as in Table 2b in Appendix II, although (in certain cases) 
with decreased significance. The outcome variable continues to be positive and highly 
significant, thus suggesting that Finland may have recently adopted a selectivity 
approach. Similar findings are also obtained for Spain where the past outcome variable 
is significant and with the expected sign in all the specifications tried. 
Table 3 reports the results for Italy. It is notable that compared with Table 1a of 
Appendix II, the most relevant change is captured by the outcome variable. In fact, even 
though all the other regressors (with the exception of social aid) do not seem to have a 
strong effect on the aid allocation process, the outcome variable appears with a positive 
sign and is highly significant. According to our results, this shows that Italy has shifted 
in the last five years towards selectivity. The same table also gives the results for the 
Netherlands which, in contrast to the previous donor, does not exhibit any relevant 
changes versus the results obtained in Appendix I. 
7 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper we perform an aid allocation analysis using the OECD-DAC data for 20 
aid donors and covering 176 recipients over the period 1980-2003. We attempt to 
improve on earlier work in this area by utilizing inter alia an aid-effectiveness variable 
‘past outcome’ in order to link together aid allocation and aid effectiveness. In line with 
previous work, we also account for both altruistic and selfish donor motives in the 
empirical analysis. Empirical results based on Tobit estimates of aid allocation for all 
individual donors over the above period vary, as expected, quite significantly among 
donors.  
We also test the robustness of our results by estimating individual regressions for the 
major donors over the period 1990-2003 to account for any major events in the aid 
arena during this period that could have potentially had an impact on the aid allocation 
process. The results for 1990-2003 seem to be similar to those derived for the 
1980-2003 period, thus implying that this is not the case. Overall, both altruistic and 
self-interest motives seem to improve the aid allocation process of most donors in the 
two periods under examination. However, when we restrict our time dimension in the 
sample further to the 1999-2003 period, some important changes regarding selectivity 
seem to emerge for a small group of donor countries.   
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List of variables and their sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Aid cap  Total real ODA commitments divided 
by the population of the recipient country 
OECD Development Aid 
Committee database (international 
development statistics) 
Social aid   Bilateral ODA/OA commitments by purpose 
(social Infrastructures and services) 
OECD (Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows) 
Trade  Net bilateral exports between the donor  
and the recipient country 
IMF bilateral trade statistics 
Population  Population expressed in millions, total  World Development Indicators 
Government  Freedom House democracy index  Freedom House Evaluation website
Past outcome  Operations evaluated by OED at the World 
Bank 
Annual Review of Development 
Effectiveness by World Bank 
Infant mortality rate  Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)  World Development Indicators 
Gini index  Inequality measures: Gini index x measures 
the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within a 
country deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution 
Human Development Reports 
GDP growth  GDP growth (annual per cent) of the recipient 
lagged one period 
World Development Indicators 
Arms transfers  Bilateral military exports from the donor 
country to the recipient country 
SIPRI database 
Per capita GDP  Real GDP per capita in constant dollars  
(base year 1985) 
Penn World tables 
Notes:   Method of estimation: Random-effects Tobit model 
  ρ: standard deviation of the random effects/standard deviation of residuals; 
  σu : panel level standard deviation; 
  σe : standard deviation of the errors; 
  Standard errors are displayed below the coefficients and z provides information regarding the 
statistical significance of the variables. 
Recall that: 
  Equation 1 estimates the model without the past outcomes variable; 
  Equation 2 estimates the full model;  
  Equations 3 and 4 test to determine whether the model is sensitive to the use of different poverty 











Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.6257 13.72 0.3906 5.27 -1.0200 -5.97 0.6198 14.97 1.3689 5.35 1.2018 55.82 1.8224 5.81 1.0223 13.22 1.1610 9.38 0.0781 1.78
0.1185 0.0742 0.1710 0.0414 0.2558 0.0215 0.3138 0.0773 0.1238 0.0438
Trade -0.0106 -2.53 -0.0003 -0.28 0.0048 1.60 -0.0003 -1.61 0.0011 1.21 0.2197 1.59 -0.0023 -1.60 0.0056 6.42 -0.0015 -1.28 0.0027 3.42
0.0042 0.0010 0.0030 0.0002 0.0009 0.1385 0.0015 0.0009 0.0012 0.0008
Population -1.0014 -4.23 -0.0381 -0.09 -4.9462 -11.14 0.1433 1.28 -2.8501 -4.54 -0.2675 -1.35 1.6488 8.37 1.0695 7.15 -0.0589 -0.44 -0.4839 -2.35
0.2366 0.4324 0.4439 0.1120 0.6280 0.1983 0.1970 0.1495 0.1350 0.2058
Government -0.5504 -3.35 -0.0226 -0.12 0.0485 0.13 -0.1006 -1.30 -1.3230 -3.36 0.2002 1.46 -0.6449 -6.17 -0.0950 -1.18 -0.3337 -1.43
0.1645 0.1807 0.3760 0.0775 0.3934 0.1374 0.1046 0.0807 0.2336
Past  0.0085 0.25
   outcome 0.0345
Infant 0.0180 2.76 -0.0040 -0.48 0.0200 1.60 -0.0010 -0.32 -0.0111 -0.69 0.0017 0.38 0.0050 0.95 0.0043 1.16 0.0051 1.41 -0.0044 -0.50
    mortality 0.0065 0.0083 0.0125 0.0030 0.0162 0.0045 0.0052 0.0037 0.0036 0.0088
Gini index 0.0495 1.81 -0.0006 -0.09 0.0053 0.52 -0.0019 -0.15 0.0459 5.96 0.0042 0.57 0.0053 0.27
0.0273 0.0066 0.0102 0.0124 0.0077 0.0073 0.0200
GDP growth -0.0815 -2.72 0.0496 1.22 -0.0012 -0.02 0.0176 1.27 -0.1228 -1.61 0.0009 0.04 -0.0003 -0.01 0.0743 3.84 -0.0513 -3.42 0.0196 0.44
0.0300 0.0406 0.0580 0.0139 0.0760 0.0223 0.0280 0.0193 0.0150 0.0447
Per capita -0.0001 -1.48 -0.0007 -2.91 0.0004 3.44 0.0000 0.80 0.0000 0.02 -0.0002 -3.11 -0.0002 -2.81 0.0000 -0.41 0.0001 3.40 -0.0006 -4.90
   GDP 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Arms  0.0000 0.02 -0.0055 -0.56 0.0021 0.63 -0.0008 -0.36 0.0237 0.08 -0.0399 -1.08 -0.0491 -1.25 0.0034 0.42 -0.0061 -0.95 0.0433 1.61
   transfers 0.0018 0.0098 0.0033 0.0023 0.3114 0.0369 0.0395 0.0081 0.0065 0.0269
Constant 4.5174 3.79 4.9293 3.93 11.9168 4.41 2.5053 6.40 17.5508 6.39 -0.0010 0.00 -6.0635 -7.88 -5.0724 -7.13 0.9762 1.74 -4.5007 -3.79
1.1923 1.2536 2.7008 0.3913 2.7456 0.4766 0.7693 0.7110 0.5599 1.1866
σu 4.2963 9.57 9.5362 19.26 14.0644 21.31 4.0907 30.89 7.9369 8.54 3.1235 9.89 2.9697 7.65 3.6529 9.65 1.6614 10.07 14.4835 42.66
0.4489 0.4952 0.6598 0.1324 0.9293 0.3159 0.3882 0.3786 0.1650 0.3395
σe 4.4838 28.63 12.0932 61.65 9.2137 31.10 4.5507 65.56 11.3129 30.20 6.3459 57.63 8.2040 . 4.1604 32.31 2.2475 28.38 11.3561 46.68
0.1566 0.1962 0.2963 0.0694 0.3746 0.1101 0.0000 0.1288 0.0792 0.2433
ρ 0.4787 0.3834 0.6997 0.4469 0.3299 0.1950 0.1158 0.4353 0.3534 0.6193
0.0565 0.0255 0.0237 0.0178 0.0565 0.0322 0.0000 0.0516 0.0484 0.0141




































































Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.4247 3.73 1.3837 1.96 -0.1699 -2.97 3.1462 9.91 1.8066 19.30 0.3128 2.32 1.2018 9.57 2.0420 8.06 -0.0082 -0.09 0.0439 2.56
0.3815 0.7049 0.0572 0.3176 -0.0935 0.1348 -0.1255 0.2535 0.0926 0.0172
Trade -0.0002 -0.48 0.0001 1.36 0.0063 3.77 0.0919 3.46 -0.0115 -5.52 -0.0111 -1.70 -0.0060 -0.98 -0.0004 -0.63 0.0009 0.40 0.0152 0.79
0.0004 0.0001 0.0017 0.0266 -0.0020 0.0065 -0.0061 0.0006 0.0022 0.0192
Population -0.2526 -0.90 0.0547 3.50 0.5264 7.44 -0.6746 -0.51 0.5006 10.69 0.8754 2.62 0.2149 2.40 0.1476 4.21 1.0837 5.91 7.3842 2.81
0.2792 0.0156 0.0708 1.3305 -0.0468 0.3338 -0.0894 0.0351 0.1833 2.6278
Government 0.3954 1.99 -0.0074 -0.75 -0.2897 -4.03 -3.5201 -2.54 -0.1181 -3.31 -0.4092 -1.98 -0.0971 -1.50 0.0016 0.08 0.0570 0.46 10.7113 3.62
0.1984 0.0098 0.0719 1.3843 0.0357 0.2065 -0.0649 0.0219 0.1252 2.9611
Past  0.0933 0.87
   outcome 0.1076
Infant 0.0293 3.38 -0.0011 -2.46 -0.0077 -2.48 -0.0980 -1.73 -0.0030 -0.35 -0.0002 -0.09 0.0006 0.67 0.0011 0.22 0.9477 6.08
   mortality 0.0087 0.0004 0.0031 0.0567 0.0084 -0.0028 0.0010 0.0052 0.1558
Gini index 0.0360 1.89 0.0012 1.29 0.0166 2.87 0.1965 1.44 0.0039 1.02 0.0255 1.45 -0.0014 -0.23 0.0006 0.31 -0.0177 -1.47 2.3802 6.99
0.0190 0.0010 0.0058 0.1366 0.0038 0.0176 -0.0060 0.0020 0.0120 0.3404
GDP growth 0.0247 0.57 0.0040 1.75 -0.0041 -0.26 0.3098 0.85 0.0249 2.64 0.0083 0.19 0.0298 2.14 -0.0047 -1.13 0.0263 1.02 1.3486 1.55
0.0435 0.0023 0.0157 0.3635 0.0094 0.0429 -0.0139 0.0042 0.0257 0.8717
Per capita  0.0002 2.19 0.0000 -1.55 -0.0001 -3.75 0.0001 0.15 -0.0001 -3.62 0.0002 2.40 0.0000 -0.57 0.0000 0.44 -0.0001 -1.00 -0.0039 -2.60
   GDP 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0015
Arms 0.0171 0.48 -0.1169 -0.42 0.0057 0.18 0.0464 1.80 0.3364 0.49 0.1687 0.84 -0.0025 -0.09
   transfers 0.0358 0.2807 0.0314 0.0258 -0.6907 0.2005 0.0270
Constant -4.2939 -3.19 0.0199 0.32 0.2336 0.71 -23.1592 -2.91 -1.8748 -9.68 -2.0346 -1.50 -0.1476 -0.35 -0.5554 -3.53 -4.2480 -6.05 -12.70
1.3453 0.0628 0.3275 7.9476 0.1936 1.3583 -0.4245 0.1573 0.7018 14.8750
σu 3.5439 8.06 0.4673 22.79 5.3006 42.35 0.0000 0.1252 0.00 3.6214 7.73 0.9570 5.52 0.3904 6.75 3.0569 8.72 10.2938
0.4396 0.0205 0.1252 0.4688 -0.1732 0.0579 0.3504 0.0000
σe 5.9267 28.16 0.2808 22.03 3.3637 37.87 29.4834 10.78 2.4309 35.19 5.2338 22.64 1.9543 26.18 0.5848 23.03 7.9908 0.00 0.0000
0.2105 0.0127 0.0888 2.7340 0.0691 0.2312 -0.0746 0.0254 0.0000
ρ 0.2634 0.7348 0.7129 0.0000 0.0026 0.00 0.3238 0.1934 0.3083 0.1277 0.0012
0.0503 0.0244 0.0130 0.0000 0.0587 -0.0590 0.0662








Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.6251 15.00 0.3855 5.25 -1.0360 -6.09 0.5162 12.98 1.3614 5.31 1.2018 55.82 1.8276 5.82 1.0001 12.59 1.1628 9.41 0.0840 2.01
0.1084 0.0734 0.1701 0.0398 0.2563 0.0215 0.3140 0.0794 0.1236 0.0417
Trade -0.0009 -1.93 0.0010 1.22 0.0044 1.47 -0.0004 -2.16 0.0011 1.22 0.2265 1.61 -0.0024 -1.65 0.0043 4.75 -0.0015 -1.26 0.0030 2.96
0.0004 0.0008 0.0030 0.0002 0.0009 0.1402 0.0015 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010
Population -0.4324 -1.48 -0.6754 -2.52 -5.0066 -11.91 -0.3158 -3.60 -2.9103 -4.53 -0.2927 -1.40 1.6256 8.07 0.7115 4.47 -0.0464 -0.34 -3.0670 -15.55
0.2923 0.2680 0.4205 0.0878 0.6428 0.2084 0.2015 0.1591 0.1378 0.1972
Government -0.5885 -3.62 0.0235 0.15 0.1053 0.29 -0.1382 -1.81 -1.2999 -3.28 0.0171 0.14 0.2112 1.52 -0.5005 -4.20 -0.0986 -1.22 -0.2415 -1.17
0.1626 0.1609 0.3570 0.0763 0.3961 0.1184 0.1388 0.1191 0.0810 0.2070
Past 0.0844 0.66 0.2467 1.56 0.4343 1.79 0.0302 0.49 0.0069 0.20 0.0381 0.43 0.0557 0.49 0.6572 8.37 -0.0374 -0.59 -0.1797 -0.99
   outcome 0.1286 0.1584 0.2429 0.0613 0.0346 0.0884 0.1136 0.0785 0.0636 0.1810
Infant  0.0209 2.94 -0.0035 -0.47 0.0240 1.87 0.0069 2.57 -0.0096 -0.58 0.0017 0.38 0.0050 0.95 0.0070 1.85 0.0046 1.25 -0.0099 -1.15
   mortality 0.0071 0.0074 0.0128 0.0027 0.0165 0.0045 0.0052 0.0038 0.0037 0.0086
Gini Index 0.0004 0.03 0.0426 1.55 -0.0014 -0.23 0.1450 0.47 0.0051 0.50 -0.0024 -0.19 0.0375 4.75 0.0047 0.65 0.0166 0.89
0.0148 0.0275 0.0063 0.3060 0.0102 0.0124 0.0079 0.0073 0.0187
GDP growth -0.0893 -3.03 0.0457 1.11 0.0001 0.00 0.0198 1.40 -0.1217 -1.60 0.0012 0.05 -0.0003 -0.01 0.0789 4.13 -0.0515 -3.44 0.0120 0.26
0.0294 0.0411 0.0576 0.0141 0.0760 0.0223 0.0280 0.0191 0.0150 0.0461
Per capita  0.0002 2.18 -0.0004 -3.48 0.0004 3.61 0.0000 -1.04 0.0000 0.07 -0.0002 -3.14 -0.0002 -2.78 0.0000 -0.10 0.0001 3.33 -0.0006 -6.08
   GDP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Arms 0.0001 0.07 -0.0044 -0.61 0.0024 0.74 -0.0006 -0.25 0.0401 0.13 -0.0392 -1.07 -0.0485 -1.23 0.0081 0.98 -0.0058 -0.90 0.0369 1.44
    transfers 0.0016 0.0072 0.0033 0.0025 0.3131 0.0368 0.0394 0.0083 0.0065 0.0256
Constant 3.3121 3.04 -2.7637 -2.46 11.0064 4.80 5.2326 11.35 17.2583 6.12 -0.0879 -0.13 -6.1283 -7.88 -5.5581 -7.99 1.0431 1.83 -3.4944 -3.05
1.0885 1.1217 2.2951 0.4612 2.8178 0.6801 0.7776 0.6958 0.5708 1.1468
σu 3.9038 8.69 10.6424 22.81 14.0687 23.14 4.6071 30.77 7.9791 8.56 3.1184 9.78 2.9405 7.52 3.0965 9.12 1.6682 10.13 11.9976 41.42
0.4493 0.4666 0.6080 0.1497 0.9319 0.3188 0.3908 0.3396 0.1646 0.2897
σe 4.5194 28.12 12.1028 62.06 9.1756 31.29 4.6447 65.21 11.3033 30.14 6.3462 57.61 8.2041 4.1244 32.43 2.2453 28.36 11.2873 47.30
0.1607 0.1950 0.2932 0.0712 0.3750 0.1102 0.0000 0.1272 0.0792 0.2386
ρ 0.4273 0.4361 0.7016 0.4959 0.3326 0.1945 0.1138 0.3605 0.3557 0.5305
0.0617 0.0230 0.0224 0.0180 0.0566 0.0325 0.0000 0.0510 0.0482 0.0149








Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. Z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.6732 10.36 1.4512 2.06 -0.1780 -3.13 3.1929 9.96 1.8033 19.18 0.1598 5.82 1.2025 9.57 1.0737 17.38 -0.0362 -0.35 0.0421 2.45
0.1614 0.7049 0.0569 0.3207 0.0940 0.0274 -0.1256 0.0618 0.1029 0.0172
Trade -0.0003 -1.09 0.0001 1.42 0.0069 3.46 0.0911 3.40 -0.0122 -5.78 0.0001 0.09 -0.0060 -0.99 0.0000 -0.06 0.0033 1.24 0.0119 0.61
0.0003 0.0001 0.0020 0.0268 0.0021 0.0012 -0.0061 0.0003 0.0027 0.0194
Population 0.9241 3.13 0.0584 3.57 0.2815 3.63 -2.0933 -1.43 0.4622 9.68 0.5371 4.71 0.2183 2.37 0.1797 9.19 1.3875 0.14 1.2973 0.47
0.2952 0.0163 0.0775 1.4600 0.0478 0.1140 0.0919 0.0196 0.1975 2.7867
Government 0.3299 2.46 -0.0079 -0.82 -0.3031 -4.38 -3.1035 -2.21 -0.0999 -2.76 -0.1516 -1.99 -0.0982 -1.50 -0.0066 -0.51 0.0943 0.69 13.6966 4.55
0.1341 0.0096 0.0692 1.4035 0.0362 0.0763 -0.0653 0.0129 0.1367 3.0125
Past 0.0150 0.15 -0.0104 -1.21 0.2560 4.36 3.8254 2.84 0.1509 4.22 0.3254 5.85 -0.0086 -0.16 2.1123 6.14
   outcome 0.1013 0.0085 0.0587 1.3476 0.0357 0.0556 0.0535 0.3438
Infant -0.0012 -2.73 -0.0094 -3.04 -0.0878 -1.52 -0.0003 -0.12 0.0013 -1.28 0.9052 5.79
   mortality 0.0004 0.0031 0.0577 -0.0029 0.0053 0.1563
Gini index 0.0047 0.41 0.0013 1.40 0.0158 2.74 0.1124 0.79 0.0021 0.55 0.0105 1.72 -0.0013 -0.21 -0.0005 -0.44 -0.0156 0.69 22.8487 6.49
0.0114 0.0010 0.0058 0.1426 0.0038 0.0061 -0.0061 0.0011 0.0123 3.5212
GDP growth 0.0167 0.61 0.0042 1.83 -0.0016 -0.10 0.2631 0.70 0.0245 2.57 0.0050 0.31 0.0299 2.14 0.0023 -0.44 0.0199 7.02 1.2752 1.46
0.0273 0.0023 0.0156 0.3775 0.0095 0.0161 0.0139 0.0024 0.0272 0.8762
Per capita  -0.0002 -2.52 0.0000 -1.64 -0.0003 -9.20 0.0002 0.52 -0.0001 -3.13 -0.0002 -5.18 0.0000 -0.57 0.0000 0.95 -0.0004 0.25 -0.0030 -1.98
   GDP 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0015
Arms 0.0025 0.41 -0.1304 -0.41 0.0065 0.20 0.0212 2.69 0.3370 0.49 0.0236 -4.99
   transfers 0.0060 0.3184 0.0319 0.0079 0.6908 0.0603
Constant -5.5118 -6.64 0.0401 0.62 0.6975 1.93 -29.4286 -3.41 -2.0751 -10.27 -2.3039 -5.50 -0.1305 -0.30 -0.5332 0.39 -2.0061 0.73 -21.1600 -3.91
0.8300 0.0648 0.3619 8.6181 0.2020 0.4191 0.4380 0.0866 0.7410 15.5835
σu 5.4543 17.96 0.4704 22.88 5.1495 40.52 0.0000 0.0987 3.8740 25.40 0.9585 5.52 0.4383 -6.16 6.9742 -2.71 10.2130
0.3036 0.0206 0.1271 0.0000 0.1525 0.1737 0.0000
σe 7.2181 54.93 0.2799 22.06 3.3487 37.82 29.4945 10.78 2.4460 35.34 3.5567 44.19 1.9542 26.19 0.6456 8.2915 0.0000
0.1314 0.0127 0.0885 2.7357 0.0692 0.0805 0.0746 0.0148
ρ 0.3635 0.7386 0.7028 0.0000 0.0016 0.5426 0.1939 0.3155 43.57 0.4143 0.0012
0.0265 0.0240 0.0135 0.0000 0.0204 0.0592 0.0000








Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. Z
Social aid 1.6326 15.09 0.7647 5.44 1.7460 34.71 0.5981 13.81 1.3680 5.35 1.1638 46.82 1.8194 5.80 1.0271 13.27 1.1631 9.39 0.0637 1.36
0.1082 0.1405 0.0503 0.0433 0.2558 0.0249 0.3137 0.0774 0.1238 0.0467
Trade -0.0009 -1.96 0.0007 0.51 0.2435 1.02 -0.0003 -1.70 0.0011 1.22 0.0007 0.43 -0.0024 -1.63 0.0055 6.48 -0.0015 -1.35 0.0041 5.34
0.0004 0.0013 0.2378 0.0002 0.0009 0.0017 0.0015 0.0008 0.0011 0.0008
Population -0.3873 -1.31 -1.4366 -4.50 -5.53 -0.0518 -0.56 -2.8200 -4.58 -0.4216 -2.45 1.6673 8.40 1.0956 7.48 -0.0431 -0.33 -0.6025 -3.30
0.2961 0.3194 30.2157 0.0933 0.6154 0.1721 0.1984 0.1464 0.1306 0.1826
Government -0.5934 -3.62 -0.4110 -1.74 14.7511 0.29 -0.1070 -1.17 -1.3302 -3.39 0.2045 1.48 -0.6390 -6.11 -0.0979 -1.21 -0.3465 -1.70
0.2365 50.3027 0.0917 0.3925 0.1381 0.1046 0.0809 0.2037
Past 
   outcome
Infant 0.0198 2.86 -0.0020 -0.21 5.9458 2.69 0.0011 0.32 -0.0125 -0.82 0.0002 0.04 0.0045 1.32
   mortality 0.0069 0.0099 2.2101 0.0035 0.0152 0.0048 0.0034
Gini index -0.1038 -1.97 -0.0030 -0.24 0.0448 5.89 -0.0065 -0.77
0.0527 0.0124 0.0076 0.0084
GDP growth -0.0888 -3.01 -0.0108 -0.24 5.0514 0.39 0.0146 1.05 -0.1220 -1.61 0.0134 0.52 -0.0002 -0.01 0.0748 3.86 -0.0510 -3.40 0.0286 0.64
0.0295 0.0459 12.8558 0.0139 0.0760 0.0256 0.0281 0.0194 0.0150 0.0448
Per capita 0.0002 2.11 -0.0001 -0.44 0.0057 0.26 0.0000 -0.75 0.0000 0.00 -0.0003 -3.26 -0.0002 -2.84 0.0000 -0.36 0.0001 3.41 -0.0013 -13.71
   GDP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0221 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Arms 0.0001 0.04 0.0007 0.11 0.0440 0.06 -0.0008 -0.35 0.0242 0.08 -0.0413 -0.96 -0.0488 -1.24 0.0036 0.45 -0.0063 -0.98 0.0389 1.52
    transfers 0.0016 0.0060 0.7683 0.0023 0.3115 0.0429 0.0395 0.0081 0.0065 0.0256
Constant 3.4959 3.31 11.0761 4.46 -66.7500 -20.16 3.6675 17.7159 6.66 0.6098 0.89 -5.9975 -7.77 -5.0702 -7.20 1.0425 1.88 -3.4214 -3.26
1.0574 2.4843 33.3800 2.6603 0.6824 0.7718 0.7044 0.5552 1.0486
σu 3.8778 8.90 5.4729 15.93 14.4660 39.66 4.0522 23.10 7.9314 8.53 4.0873 9.36 3.0189 7.80 3.7055 9.87 1.6577 10.07 14.4458 43.13
0.4356 0.3436 36.4700 0.1754 0.9295 0.4366 0.3869 0.3752 0.1647 0.3349
σe 4.5232 28.24 6.1685 27.09 22.4100 35.54 4.5529 65.39 11.3152 30.21 7.4080 60.48 8.2043 . 4.1574 32.34 2.2488 28.39 11.3190 47.16
0.1602 0.2277 63.4418 0.0696 0.3745 0.1225 0.0000 0.1286 0.0792 0.2400
ρ 0.4236 0.4405 0.9763 0.4420 0.3295 0.2334 0.1192 0.4427 0.3521 0.6196
0.0600 0.0374 0.0017 0.0226 0.0564 0.0388 0.0000 0.0505 0.0483 0.0140








Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.4457 3.78 0.8486 4.94 -0.1871 -3.31 2.4936 13.29 1.2646 8.79 0.1518 5.52 1.2931 13.15 1.0409 17.44 -0.0082 -0.09
0.3825 0.1718 0.0566 0.1877 0.1438 0.0275 0.0983 0.0597 0.0927
Trade -0.0002 -0.45 0.0014 11.19 0.0086 5.08 0.1083 6.43 -0.0020 -0.31 0.0004 0.30 0.0024 1.34 -0.0001 -0.42 0.0009 0.40
0.0004 0.0001 0.0017 0.0168 0.0064 0.0012 0.0018 0.0004 0.0022
Population -0.0052 -1.21 0.1138 9.44 0.3078 4.50 1.4795 2.41 0.2260 0.93 0.2852 3.19 0.4360 6.21 0.1863 9.77 1.0837 5.91
0.0043 0.0121 0.0684 0.6151 0.2443 0.0895 0.0702 0.0191 0.1833
Government 0.3703 1.87 -0.0411 -3.88 -0.3308 -4.98 -1.6602 -2.85 -0.1927 -2.02 -0.1780 -2.28 -0.0250 -0.56 -0.0026 -0.20 0.0570 0.46
0.1976 0.0106 0.0664 0.5816 0.0953 0.0782 0.0443 0.0129 0.1252
Past  0.0371 3.82 0.0935 0.87
   outcome 0.0097 0.1076
Infant  0.0302 3.47 0.0053 1.35 0.0011 0.22
   mortality 0.0087 0.0039 0.0052
Gini index 0.0358 1.90 0.0038 4.89 0.0199 3.48 0.2053 3.51 0.0126 1.55 0.0116 2.09 -0.0002 -0.04 -0.0011 -1.07 -0.0177 -1.47
0.0188 0.0008 0.0057 0.0586 0.0081 0.0056 0.0037 0.0011 0.0120
GDP 0.0234 0.54 0.0024 1.10 -0.0038 -0.25 -0.0287 -0.19 0.0176 0.85 0.0083 0.57 0.0320 3.74 0.0027 1.11 0.0262 1.02
   growth 0.0435 0.0022 0.0149 0.1547 0.0206 0.0146 0.0086 0.0024 0.0257
Per capita 0.0004 2.11 0.0000 -6.41 -0.0003 -9.83 0.0000 0.14 0.0001 1.00 -0.0003 -6.66 -0.0001 -5.71 0.0000 -3.54 -0.0001 -1.00
    GDP 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Arms 0.0167 0.47 -0.1009 -0.38 0.0842 0.88 0.0188 2.44 0.0135 0.44 0.0147 0.25
    transfers 0.0356 0.2644 0.0951 0.0077 0.0310 0.0591
Constant -4.6332 -3.55 -0.2563 -3.00 0.8773 2.81 -42.6237 -11.25 -1.3494 -1.57 -2.0832 -5.19 -1.5349 -4.90 -0.6542 -7.15 -4.2491 -6.05
1.3046 0.0855 0.3120 3.7896 0.8603 0.4017 0.3131 0.0915 0.7019
σu 3.4215 7.33 0.5451 28.69 5.1067 41.03 0.0000 1.8388 5.58 4.1190 21.03 1.7813 9.95 0.5062 16.82 3.0573 8.72
0.4670 0.0190 0.1245 0.3298 0.1959 0.1791 0.0301 0.3506
σe 5.9489 28.18 0.4586 40.01 3.3452 37.97 25.7063 17.32 2.2648 21.25 3.5765 44.32 2.3358 49.15 0.6446 43.56 7.9931 .
0.2111 0.0115 0.0881 1.4845 0.1066 0.0807 0.0475 0.0148
ρ 0.2486 0.5856 0.6997 0.0000 0.3973 0.5701 0.3677 0.3815 0.1276
0.0534 0.0188 0.0138 0.0882 0.0247 0.0472 0.0296









Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.6251 14.99 0.7638 5.43 -1.0325 -6.05 0.2218 2.45 1.3604 5.31 1.1635 46.77 1.8245 5.81 1.0078 12.46 1.1648 9.42 0.0640 1.37
0.1084 0.1406 0.1706 0.0907 0.2563 0.0249 0.3140 0.0809 0.1237 0.0466
Trade -0.0009 -1.94 0.0006 0.48 0.0045 1.51 0.0002 0.57 0.0011 1.22 0.0006 0.35 -0.0025 -1.68 0.0042 4.67 -0.0015 -1.35 0.0041 5.35
0.0004 0.0013 0.0030 0.0004 0.0009 0.0017 0.0015 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008
Population -0.4298 -1.54 -1.4464 -4.50 -4.9204 -11.52 -0.7435 -3.59 -2.8886 -4.56 -0.4162 -2.32 1.6442 8.10 0.7514 4.70 -0.0302 -0.23 -0.5797 -2.97
0.2784 0.3211 0.4273 0.2074 0.6332 0.1794 0.2029 0.1598 0.1338 0.1955
Government -0.5887 -3.62 -0.4034 -1.68 0.0578 0.15 -0.5046 -3.05 -1.3048 -3.30 -0.0516 -0.38 0.2156 1.55 -0.4927 -4.18 -0.1013 -1.25 -0.3463 -1.70
0.1626 0.2395 0.3757 0.1653 0.3955 0.1372 0.1395 0.1178 0.0813 0.2040
Past 0.0845 0.66 0.0358 0.21 0.4962 2.04 -0.0272 -0.22 0.0238 0.23 0.0549 0.48 0.6479 8.21 -0.0320 -0.51 -0.0612 -0.33
   outcome 0.1286 0.1702 0.2430 0.1242 0.1020 0.1137 0.0789 0.0632 0.1843
Infant 0.0209 3.13 -0.0020 -0.21 0.0210 1.62 -0.0106 -0.68 0.0002 0.05 0.0040 1.13 -0.0067 -0.80
   mortality 0.0067 0.0098 0.0130 0.0157 0.0048 0.0035 0.0084
Gini index -0.1041 -1.97 0.0488 1.54 0.1510 0.50 -0.0036 -0.29 0.0359 4.57
0.0527 0.0318 0.3046 0.0124 0.0078
GDP growth -0.0892 -3.04 -0.0110 -0.24 0.0077 0.13 -0.0295 -0.86 -0.1210 -1.59 0.0134 0.52 -0.0002 -0.01 0.0791 4.14 -0.0510 -3.41 0.0283 0.63
0.0294 0.0459 0.0579 0.0343 0.0760 0.0256 0.0280 0.0191 0.0150 0.0450
Per capita 0.0002 2.22 -0.0001 -0.42 0.0004 3.28 0.0001 1.64 0.0000 0.05 -0.0003 -3.25 -0.0002 -2.81 0.0000 -0.05 0.0001 3.35 -0.0013 -13.71
   GDP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Arms 0.0001 0.07 0.0009 0.15 0.0022 0.68 -0.0011 -0.32 0.0412 0.13 -0.0411 -0.95 -0.0482 -1.22 0.0086 1.03 -0.0061 -0.94 0.0390 1.52
   transfers 0.0016 0.0061 0.0033 0.0035 0.3131 0.0431 0.0395 0.0083 0.0065 0.0256
Constant 3.3213 3.20 11.0159 4.39 11.7622 4.57 4.2293 2.73 17.3781 6.32 0.7886 0.93 -6.0613 -7.77 -5.5234 -7.82 1.1086 1.94 -3.3346 -3.06
1.0371 2.5082 2.5751 1.5499 2.7517 0.8461 0.7800 0.7063 0.5709 1.0913
σu 3.9015 8.82 5.4807 15.80 13.9720 22.63 4.2021 17.66 7.9757 8.56 4.0856 9.08 2.9898 7.67 3.1320 9.19 1.6632 10.11 14.4340 42.78
0.4423 0.3468 0.6173 0.2380 0.9319 0.4501 0.3896 0.3407 0.1645 0.3374
σe 4.5197 28.17 6.1674 27.06 9.1975 31.24 4.7144 29.66 11.3050 30.15 7.4085 60.44 8.2043 4.1240 32.45 2.2471 28.38 11.3219 47.20
0.1604 0.2279 0.2945 0.1590 0.3749 0.1226 0.0000 0.1271 0.0792 0.2399
ρ 0.4270 0.4412 0.6977 0.4427 0.3323 0.2332 0.1172 0.3658 0.3539 0.6191
0.0607 0.0378 0.0229 0.0335 0.0566 0.0400 0.0000 0.0508 0.0482 0.0141










Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.5378 4.01 0.8820 5.13 -0.1819 -3.20 -0.1571 -0.85 1.2335 8.82 0.3244 2.46 1.3000 13.41 2.0117 8.08
0.3834 0.1719 0.0569 0.1858 0.1398 0.1320 0.0969 0.2489
Trade -0.0001 -0.33 0.0016 11.17 0.0022 1.37 0.0139 4.99 -0.0018 -0.33 -0.0112 -1.76 0.0029 1.45 -0.0004 -0.57
0.0004 0.0001 0.0016 0.0028 0.0053 0.0064 0.0020 0.0006
Population -0.0090 -2.26 0.2846 18.61 0.3647 4.59 0.1577 0.77 0.0405 0.32 0.6252 1.88 0.3332 4.08 0.1381 3.95
0.0040 0.0153 0.0795 0.2054 0.1265 0.3331 0.0818 0.0350
Government 0.4126 2.09 -0.0261 -3.23 -0.3219 -4.63 -0.3587 -2.73 -0.1817 -1.98 -0.3267 -1.59 -0.0126 -0.28 0.0031 0.14
0.1974 0.0081 0.0696 0.1314 0.0916 0.2054 0.0459 0.0221
Past outcome 0.0342 3.88 -0.0098 -1.31 0.2761 4.76 -0.1638 -1.01 0.0035 0.86 0.5758 3.69 0.0603 1.81 0.0242 1.40
0.0088 0.0075 0.0580 0.1626 0.0041 0.1560 0.0334 0.0174
Infant mortality 0.4155 2.56 -0.0106 -3.46 0.0125 0.18 0.0041 0.49 0.0009 0.97
0.1625 0.0031 0.0711 0.0084 0.0009
Gini index 0.0292 1.55 0.0037 4.76 0.0292 3.76 0.0112 1.36 0.0191 1.11 -0.0004 -0.12
0.0188 0.0008 0.0078 0.0082 0.0172 0.0037
GDP growth 0.0222 0.51 0.0034 1.48 -0.0020 -0.13 -0.0312 -1.06 0.0185 0.90 0.0050 0.12 0.0326 3.78 -0.0049 -1.17
0.0433 0.0023 0.0154 0.0295 0.0207 0.0421 0.0086 0.0042
Per capita GDP 0.0004 2.34 0.0000 -1.50 -0.0003 -9.13 0.0001 1.97 0.0000 -0.04 0.0003 2.85 -0.0002 -5.41 0.0002 1.32
0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
Arms transfers 0.0136 0.38 -0.1386 -0.43 0.0877 0.93 0.0575 2.27 0.0177 0.57 0.1539 0.77
0.0355 0.3223 0.0946 0.0254 0.0313 0.2010
Constant -5.6352 -4.14 -0.9821 -17.96 0.9055 2.31 -2.7628 -2.38 -0.8654 -1.25 -3.2897 -2.37 -1.3856 -4.59 -0.5916 -3.66
1.3610 0.0547 0.3916 1.1617 0.6939 1.3899 0.3019 0.1617
σu 3.3824 7.07 0.6390 28.40 5.1983 39.94 2.4345 8.86 2.0076 7.19 3.5300 7.54 1.6976 11.33 0.4000 6.89
0.4786 0.0225 0.1302 0.2749 0.2793 0.4681 0.1498 0.0581
σe 5.9333 28.07 0.4589 40.91 3.3406 37.78 1.9691 13.50 2.2485 21.16 5.1557 22.66 2.3362 49.15 0.5831 23.02
0.2114 0.0112 0.0884 0.1459 0.1063 0.2276 0.0475 0.0253
ρ 0.2453 0.6597 0.7077 0.6045 0.4436 0.3192 0.3456 0.3200
0.0550 0.0180 0.0133 0.0633 0.0718 0.0599 0.0403 0.0663








Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.7029 16.71 0.6545 4.39 -0.1320 -0.62 0.6516 14.53 1.2609 3.54 3.1990 54.80 2.6009 5.86
0.1019 0.1492 0.2129 0.0449 0.3565 0.0584 0.4435
Trade -0.0001 -0.18 0.0007 0.43 0.0039 0.92 -0.0003 -1.20 0.0017 1.41 0.0097 0.08 -0.0031 -1.81
0.0005 0.0017 0.0042 0.0002 0.0012 0.1201 0.0017
Population -0.4312 -1.41 -1.7205 -3.37 -4.0535 -5.76 0.1665 1.50 -3.3324 -4.10 0.4344 2.56 2.3117 9.12
0.3065 0.5101 0.7041 0.1111 0.8131 0.1696 0.2534
Government -0.5000 -2.49 -0.6587 -1.90 0.2955 0.58 0.0511 0.59 -1.4670 -2.50 0.1683 0.87
0.2004 0.3469 0.5071 0.0864 0.5874 0.1932
Past outcome
Gini index 0.0154 1.01 -0.1728 -2.61 0.0370 1.23 0.0017 0.23 0.0043 0.09 0.0173 1.79 -0.0024 -0.13
0.0153 0.0662 0.0301 0.0071 0.0489 0.0097 0.0185
Infant mortality 0.0142 1.96 0.0318 2.12 -0.0006 -0.17 -0.0066 -0.29 0.0014 0.31 0.0109 1.26
0.0073 0.0150 0.0034 0.0226 0.0045 0.0086
GDP growth -0.0721 -2.29 0.0216 0.32 -0.0061 -0.09 0.0020 0.13 -0.1022 -0.92 -0.0183 -0.82 -0.0068 -0.16
0.0316 0.0665 0.0676 0.0155 0.1108 0.0223 0.0418
Per capita GDP 0.0001 0.83 -0.0003 -1.08 0.0004 2.34 -0.0001 -1.51 0.0000 -0.05 -0.0001 -1.10 -0.0003 -3.45
0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
Arms transfers 0.0002 0.15 0.0002 0.01 0.0013 0.41 -0.0815 -1.60 -0.1372 -1.28
0.0016 0.0103 0.0031 0.0508 0.1076
Constant 3.4486 2.91 16.0732 4.70 7.5911 2.74 2.3855 5.62 19.0109 5.08 -1.6052 -3.90 -7.7252 -7.62
1.1843 3.4177 2.7740 0.4243 3.7458 0.4111 1.0134
σu 3.3747 8.10 5.9655 11.39 11.3833 10.52 4.0160 23.88 7.9036 6.63 2.5402 10.70 2.2528 3.34
0.4169 0.5239 1.0819 0.1682 1.1928 0.2373 0.6739
σe 3.9973 23.27 6.0735 20.30 8.5231 24.26 4.0959 49.88 13.5925 23.94 4.9903 45.04 10.4264
0.1718 0.2992 0.3514 0.0821 0.5678 0.1108 0.0000
ρ 0.4161 0.4910 0.6408 0.4901 0.2527 0.2058 0.0446
0.0655 0.0551 0.0496 0.0236 0.0617 0.0318 0.0000









































































Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.1188 17.56 2.3271 6.74 2.1807 6.75 2.6864 18.70
0.0637 0.3455 0.3233 0.1436
Trade -0.0030 -1.55 -0.0148 -2.29 -0.0062 -0.88 -0.0002 -0.65
0.0019 0.0065 0.0071 0.0003
Population 0.5631 8.05 0.7833 3.21 0.1097 1.32 0.0725 4.83
0.0699 0.2440 0.0829 0.0151
Government -0.1026 -2.33 -0.2564 -1.36 -0.0263 -0.37 0.0073 0.63
0.0440 0.1889 0.0718 0.0116
Past outcome
Gini index 0.0046 1.46 0.0298 1.52 0.0071 0.88 0.0020 1.66
0.0032 0.0196 0.0081 0.0012
-0.0095 -1.11 0.0031 0.91 0.0004 0.86
0.0086 0.0034 0.0005
GDP growth 0.0143 1.64 0.0653 1.35 0.0283 1.63 -0.0046 -1.87
0.0087 0.0484 0.0174 0.0025
Per capita GDP -0.0002 -6.57 0.0002 2.19 0.0000 -0.11 -0.0001 -2.00
0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Arms transfers 0.2595 2.12 0.1008 2.67 0.3696 0.46 0.1047 0.97
0.1226 0.0378 0.8075 0.1085
Constant -1.8921 -7.31 -2.5062 -2.18 -0.7131 -1.58 -0.3134 -4.08
0.2588 1.1503 0.4501 0.0769
σu 1.8042 13.79 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.0000
0.1308 0.9567
σe 1.4539 29.80 5.5976 19.77 2.3774 23.25 0.3405 20.27
0.0488 0.2831 0.1023 0.0168










Table 2 a 
Equation 2 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.6963 16.50 0.6538 4.38 -0.1337 -0.64 0.6195 14.94 1.2603 3.54 3.1976 54.77 2.6309 5.94
0.1028 0.1492 0.2099 0.0415 0.3565 0.0584 0.4431
Trade -0.0001 -0.13 0.0006 0.35 0.0036 0.93 -0.0003 -1.78 0.0017 1.41 0.0484 0.39 -0.0031 -1.82
0.0005 0.0018 0.0039 0.0002 0.0012 0.1232 0.0017
Population -0.4619 -1.46 -1.6364 -2.91 -4.1546 -6.43 0.1338 1.14 -3.3616 -4.00 0.3103 1.67 2.2108 8.28
0.3160 0.5628 0.6457 0.1176 0.8410 0.1860 0.2669
Government -0.4970 -2.48 -0.6810 -1.94 0.2485 0.50 -0.0957 -1.19 -1.4620 -2.48 0.1421 1.16 0.2045 1.06
0.2003 0.3517 0.4940 0.0806 0.5888 0.1229 0.1937
Past outcome 0.0716 0.46 -0.1184 -0.47 0.4261 1.40 0.0178 0.29 0.0655 0.14 0.1111 1.21 0.1866 1.05
0.1546 0.2525 0.3052 0.0623 0.4752 0.0919 0.1778
Gini index 0.0137 1.97 -0.1700 -2.57 0.0244 0.78 -0.0007 -0.11 0.0024 0.05 0.0163 1.67 -0.0056 -0.30
0.0157 0.0662 0.0313 0.0066 0.0507 0.0097 0.0187
Infant mortality 0.0143 0.46 0.0313 2.11 -0.0009 -0.31 -0.0066 -0.29 0.0015 0.33 0.0112 1.30
0.0073 0.0148 0.0030 0.0226 0.0045 0.0086
GDP growth -0.0721 0.87 0.0224 0.34 -0.0049 -0.07 0.0176 1.27 -0.1014 -0.91 -0.0177 -0.80 -0.0069 -0.16
0.0315 0.0665 0.0668 0.0139 0.1110 0.0223 0.0416
Per capita GDP 0.0001 -2.29 -0.0003 -0.95 0.0004 2.34 0.0000 0.79 0.0000 -0.05 -0.0001 -0.93 -0.0003 -3.36
0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
Arms transfers 0.0002 0.80 -0.0001 -0.01 0.0016 0.51 -0.0799 -1.60 -0.1341 -1.26
0.0016 0.0103 0.0031 0.0499 0.1067
Constant 3.3755 0.16 16.1729 4.77 7.4648 2.74 2.4935 6.28 18.9346 5.00 -2.2494 -3.60 -8.0156 -7.71
1.2077 3.3913 2.7262 0.3969 3.7884 0.6241 1.0394
σu 3.3914 2.80 5.9544 11.48 11.3595 11.11 4.0872 30.83 7.9122 6.62 2.5085 10.62 2.1185 3.01
0.4209 0.5187 1.0223 0.1326 1.1950 0.2362 0.7036
σe 3.9934 8.06 6.0745 20.30 8.4910 24.32 4.5510 65.55 13.5906 23.94 4.9890 45.03 10.4263
0.1719 0.2993 0.3491 0.0694 0.5678 0.1108 0.0000
ρ 0.4190 23.24 0.4900 0.6416 0.4465 0.2531 0.2018 0.0396
0.0660 0.0547 0.0474 0.0178 0.0618 0.0316 0.0000
Japan Canada Switzerland USA United Kingdom France Germany
 





Table 2 b 
Equation 2 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social aid 1.1227 17.67 0.3082 4.73 2.1931 6.73 2.1018 9.96
0.0635 0.0652 0.3256 0.2109
Trade -0.0028 -1.48 -0.0018 -1.14 -0.0064 -0.89 -0.0001 -0.32
0.0019 0.0016 0.0071 0.0003
Population 0.5352 7.76 0.6979 4.40 0.1194 1.35 0.0799 3.39
0.0689 0.1586 0.0883 0.0235
Government -0.0970 -2.25 -0.1406 -1.28 -0.0291 -0.40 0.0107 0.69
0.0431 0.1102 0.0724 0.0154
Past outcome 0.0629 1.94 0.5628 7.23 -0.0236 -0.32 0.0341 2.82
0.0324 0.0778 0.0741 0.0121
Gini index 0.0324 0.0778 0.0741 0.0004 0.33
0.0036 1.12 0.0112 1.58 0.0079 0.94 0.0012
Infant mortality 0.0032 0.0071 0.0084 0.0003 0.67
0.0031 0.93 0.0005
GDP growth 0.0146 1.68 -0.0015 -0.08 0.0034 -0.0034 -1.33
0.0087 0.0192 0.0285 1.64 0.0025
Per capita GDP -0.0002 -6.43 -0.0002 -3.64 0.0174 -0.0001 -1.91
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.12 0.0000
Arms transfers 0.2517 2.05 0.0687 4.49 0.0000 0.0666 0.63
0.1226 0.0153 0.3627 0.45 0.1059
Constant -1.9825 -7.76 -3.4817 -5.43 0.8077 -0.3870 -3.69
0.2555 0.6407 -0.6881 -1.51 0.1049
σu 1.8067 14.00 2.8811 13.13 0.4567 0.2003 5.28
0.1290 0.2194 0.0000 0.0379
σe 1.4535 29.83 3.6234 35.07 0.3030 18.83
0.0487 0.1033 2.3772 23.25 0.0161
ρ 0.6071 0.3873 0.1022 0.3040
0.0355 0.0378 0.0000 0.0857







Estimation results for selected donors, 1999-2003 
 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. Z Coeff. z
Social   aid  1.7750 9.77 3.1240 14.38 1.9460 15.14 0.7350 6.29 2.0520 2.04 2.8360 15.18 1.7620 2.44 1.7900 2.76 -0.1340 -1.98 0.5290 2.83
0.1820 0.2170 0.1290 0.1170 1.0060 0.1870 0.7230 0.6490 0.0680 0.1870
Trade -0.0060 -1.34 0.0000 -0.39 0.0050 1.90 0.0000 -1.78 0.0000 0.65 -0.0020 -2.18 -0.0030 -1.11 0.0110 0.47 0.0060 3.45 0.0000 -0.31
0.0050 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0030 0.0230 0.0020 0.0010
Population 0.4930 3.15 0.0560 2.46 -0.6710 -1.66 0.0560 0.31 -0.0020 -0.75 -2.2690 -1.69 2.7460 3.36 -0.0440 -0.23 -0.8970 -7.50 0.2190 0.93
0.1560 0.0230 0.4050 0.1820 0.0020 1.3380 0.8170 0.1910 0.1200 0.2350
Government -0.0840 -0.76 0.0030 0.16 0.0890 0.31 0.0090 0.07 0.0900 0.66 -1.3100 -1.28 -1.0440 -1.67 -0.1040 -0.71 0.2420 1.91 0.0390 0.22
0.1110 0.0170 0.2890 0.1360 0.1370 1.0220 0.6260 0.1460 0.1270 0.1770
Infant 0.0010 1.14 0.0030 0.27 0.0110 1.99 0.0040 0.63 -0.0410 -0.85 0.0000 -0.02 0.0040 0.60 0.0010 0.29 0.0000 0.03
   mortality 0.0010 0.0110 0.0050 0.0060 0.0480 0.0320 0.0060 0.0030 0.0070
Gini index 0.0070 1.00 0.0010 0.65 0.0110 0.44 0.0230 2.47 0.0120 0.88 -0.1180 -1.37 -0.0310 -0.54 0.0030 0.21 -0.0030 -0.40 0.0220 1.85
0.0070 0.0020 0.0240 0.0090 0.0130 0.0860 0.0570 0.0150 0.0070 0.0120
Past 0.1130 1.13 0.0300 1.74 0.3430 1.16 0.2430 1.88 0.2370 1.69 0.7750 0.72 0.1950 0.29 0.0390 0.24 -0.2900 -2.45 0.4010 2.45
   outcome 0.1000 0.0170 0.2970 0.1290 0.1410 1.0760 0.6770 0.1600 0.1180 0.1640
GDP growth 0.0370 1.52 -0.0010 -0.19 0.0050 0.05 0.0310 0.95 0.0200 0.48 -0.0760 -0.25 0.0560 0.28 0.0000 -0.17 -0.0060 -0.30 0.0570 1.40
0.0240 0.0050 0.0870 0.0330 0.0430 0.2990 0.1990 0.0000 0.0190 0.0410
Per capita 0.0000 -2.25 0.0000 -1.42 0.0000 0.46 0.0000 1.56 0.0000 0.57 -0.0010 -1.61 -0.0010 -2.08 0.0950 2.13 0.0000 -6.41 0.0000 -0.71
   GDP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0440 0.0000 0.0000
Arms  0.3070 0.92 0.0680 4.53 -0.0060 -0.19 -0.0610 -0.56 0.2860 0.25 0.0050 0.16
   transfers 0.3340 0.0150 0.0310 0.1090 1.1350 0.0330
Constant -2.5260 -4.10 -0.3540 -2.95 0.3340 0.18 -0.0520 -0.07 -1.2900 -1.42 16.3420 2.99 -4.6620 -1.37 -0.2870 -0.30 1.4900 3.02 -2.4010 -2.56
0.6160 0.1200 1.8290 0.7090 0.9100 5.4590 3.4070 0.9520 0.4930 0.9360
σu 1.6740 7.46 0.0000 0.00 2.6320 4.50 2.4290 10.06 0.0000 . 13.8280 4.74 3.6730 0.0000 0.00 4.8150 43.99 3.1410 8.65
0.2240 0.0570 0.5850 0.2410 2.9170 1.1090 0.1090 0.3630
σe 1.8720 15.93 0.3260 14.32 4.9720 14.66 3.2920 26.55 3.0330 16.60 33.2420 25.31 22.4920 24.06 3.1770 16.37 1.8450 22.38 3.8700 23.50
0.1180 0.0230 0.3390 0.1240 0.1830 1.3130 0.9350 0.1940 0.0820 0.1650
ρ 0.4440 0.0000 0.2190 0.3520 0.0000 0.1480 0.0260 0.0000 0.8720 0.3970
0.0710 0.0000 0.0870 0.0510 0.0580 0.0000 0.0110 0.0600







Estimation results for selected donors, 1999-2003 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Social   aid  3.7080 8.84 5.1530 1.92 0.7110 5.91 1.9730 20.75
0.4190 2.6840 0.1200 0.0950
Trade -0.0050 -3.17 -0.0090 -2.35 0.0000 -0.09 -0.0010 -1.89
0.0020 0.0040 0.0020 0.0000
Population 0.6270 4.00 3.9970   -0.9200 -1.80 -0.1000 -0.37
0.1570   0.5110 0.2730
Government -0.0390 -0.35 -2.7360 -6.72 -0.7040 -2.07 -0.2710 -1.26
0.1120 0.4070 0.3400 0.2160
Infant mortality -0.0590 -2.28 0.0010 0.14
0.0260 0.0060
Gini index -0.0070 -0.70 -0.1050 -2.18 -0.1640 -2.76 -0.0260 -2.01
0.0100 0.0480 0.0590 0.0130
Past outcome 0.3780 3.34 -1.6710 -3.11 -0.2610 -0.94 -0.0030 -0.01
0.1130 0.5380 0.2770 0.2490
GDP growth -0.0240 -0.70 -0.0070 -0.04 0.0020 0.03 0.0570 1.36
0.0350 0.1610 0.0720 0.0420
Per capita GDP 0.0000 -2.24 -0.0020 -5.11 0.0000 -0.68 0.0000 -3.03
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arms transfers 0.0720 3.33 -1.2440 -1.13 0.0030 0.17 -0.0010 -0.53
0.0220 1.1010 0.0180 0.0030
Constant -1.9340 -3.11 1.3980   14.5350 4.23 4.1700 4.15
0.6210   3.4360 1.0060
σu 0.0000   29.4750 16.08 4.3830 8.27 4.8600 12.16
  1.8340 0.5300 0.4000
σe 4.0160 25.68 15.8380 23.17 4.7880 14.65 2.4030 12.96
0.1560 0.6840 0.3270 0.1850
ρ 0.0000 0.7760 0.4560 0.8040
  0.0300 0.0740 0.0340
Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom USA
 
 
39 